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Wiaocki, Lawrence D,, M.A., June 1984. Political Science
Nuclear Modernization in NATO: Atlantic Cohesion and Nuclear Deterrence 
(141 pp.)
Director: Dr. Forest Grieves
This study examines the tactical nuclear policies of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and assesses the most recently implemented 
component of those policies, the deployment of ground—launched cruise and 
Pershing II missiles In Western Europe. A brief history of American 
nuclear strategy is presented before the focus of the study, the 1979 
decision to deploy modernized long-range nuclear weapons, is examined.
An analysis of the military and political considerations which prompted 
American officials to support the European initiative for modernization 
of the Alliance's nuclear forces forms the basis for the study's 
conclusions.
The author relies primarily on Congressional documents and the state­
ments and writings of officials of the Executive Branch of the United 
States government for source material. Books and articles by political 
analysts and newspaper and journal articles are also cited.
The study concludes that the U.S. decision to deploy the new missile 
systems was not based on military considerations. The administration 
of President Jimmy Carter was convinced that the new deployments were 
needed to enhance the cohesiveness of the Alliance and were necessary 
to secure the role of the United States as Allied leader. The ground- 
launched cruise and Pershing II missiles had not been developed within 
the context of a cohesive U.S. plan for nuclear force structuring, but 
because of the pace of technology, these systems were available to fill 
a role as symbols of America's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance.
The study notes that many proponents of the new deployments believed 
that the missiles would fill a dangerous gap in the Alliance's deterrent 
structure. The author disagrees with this assessment and contends that 
both the ground-launched cruise and Pershing II systems should be catego­
rized as strategic weapons. He concludes the study by pointing out that 
strategic weapons deployed in vulnerable, forward positions increase the 
dangers of nuclear escalation. He recommends that the Alliance attempt 
to find a less dangerous, more appropriate symbol of Atlantic cohesion.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 31, 1983, the first of a new generation of 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles officially became oper­
ational in Britain and West Germany, Despite an autumn of 
sometimes violent protests by groups opposed to the 
deployments, and in the face of Soviet threats to suspend 
arms control negotiations, the final decision to deploy had 
been confirmed by the ruling parties in London and Bonn, 
and implemented by the government of the United States. 
During debates in all three countries, supporters of the 
new systems emphasized the importance of the deployments in 
strengthening the political cohesion and enhancing the 
military deterrent posture of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)»
From its inception NATO * s deterrent strategy has 
stressed reliance on the military prowess of the united 
States, Many prominent U.S. policymakers have insisted that 
an effective, credible deterrent can be maintained only 
through a military program which matches or exceeds that 
of the Soviet Union, Others responsible for military plan­
ning have argued that policies which attempt to match U.S. 
and Soviet military systems accelerate the arms race, unduly 
increase defense spending, and do little to enhance the 
security of either nation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Worldwide military expenditures for 1982 totaled 
$660 billion dollars. It seems quite clear that such exces­
sive military spending must be harmful to the world's economic 
social, and political order. Yet, it seems just as clear that 
recent military policies have been planned and implemented 
by rational leaders working within existing national and 
international systems.
This study will focus on the most recently implemented 
component of Western deterrent strategy, the NATO deployment 
of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles, and will 
examine the political and military considerations which led 
to the decision to station these systems in Europe. The 
relationship of the deployment to the concepts of nuclear 
threshold and escalation control will also be discussed.
Proponents of NATO's nuclear modernization program 
have maintained that the installation of the ground-launched 
cruise and Pershing II missiles was an essential element in 
reestablishing the credibility of the Alliance's nuclear 
deterrent. A major purpose of the following study is to 
test the accuracy of this claim.
Critics of the American military establishment contend 
that new weapons systems are often developed and deployed 
without consideration of their political consequences.
The following study will examine the validity of this thesis 
in the context of NATO's tactical nuclear history and as it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
applies to the 1983 modernization program.
The Alliance decision to upgrade its intermediate 
nuclear systems set off a series of debates and public pro­
tests which weakened the internal cohesion of the West German 
government and, by early 1984, threatened the survival of 
the governments in Belgium and the Netherlands. The tensions 
inherent in any alliance of sixteen sovereign states increased 
perceptibly as discussions of the deployments led to a crit­
ical examination of the credibility of America's nuclear 
commitment to the Alliance. The U.S. role as Allied leader 
also came under close scrutiny during the debates.
Since deployments in West Germany, Britain, and Italy 
were still underway in early 1984, and the final decisions on 
modernization had not been made by the governments of Belgium 
and the Netherlands, public debate and protest seemed likely 
to continue for some time, contributing to further pressures 
on the cohesiveness of the Alliance,
The need for deterrence has always been acknowledged by 
members of the Alliance, but debates on the proper mix of 
military forces needed to pose a credible deterrent have been 
a persistent source of intra—Alliance tension. The first 
chapter of this study examines the history of the role of 
tactical nuclear weapons in Allied deterrent strategy. The 
remaining chapters examine the military and political consid­
erations which prompted U.S. policymakers to deploy the 
ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe.
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CHAPTER I
U.S. TACTICAL NUCLEAR POLICY; 1945 TO 19 76
Americans celebrating the new year of 1946 had much 
cause for optimism. U.S. industry, spared from the ravages 
of the recent war, was in a position to dominate expanding 
world markets, and the new united Nations, formed by the 
victorious allies, seemed to offer real hope that all nations 
could cooperate in avoiding future worldwide massacres. Yet 
for U.S. policymakers the months following the end of hostil­
ities were filled with ominous signs that the promise of 
lasting peace was an illusion. Soviet actions in Europe 
could hardly be perceived as conforming to the spirit of the 
United Nations Charter, and as if to confirm that cooperation 
between East and West had been only a fleeting dream, Josef 
Stalin delivered a distinctly anti—American diatribe in 
February 1946. A month later Winston Churchill responded 
with his "iron curtain" speech. The cold war had been 
declared.
It soon became clear to the Allies on the western side 
of this curtain that while economic recovery was essential 
for long term stability, some economic programs would 
have to be sacrificed in order to maintain the military 
forces with which to counter Soviet strength. The lessons 
of the last war seemed very clear to the Western Allies;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
appeasement was an invitation to aggression, and aggressors 
understood only one element of national policy, military 
power. Stalin seemed reluctant to demobilize his massive 
army. Yet Western Europe, divided and still devastated by 
the effects of war, could hardly be expected to field forces 
substantial enough to persuade the Soviet Union that aggres­
sion would not pay. England, which historically had acted 
to balance the military equation on the continent, was no 
longer strong enough to do so. In the new world order the 
United States would fill that role, and in the age old 
tradition of balance of power politics the role was cast 
within the context of a military alliance. In many ways 
the part which the United States was about to play seemed 
quite conventional, with many of the same actors playing 
in their same roles, but the new drama'was about to be 
enacted on a very different stage, in ’• a weird and night­
mare land as yet undreamed of— the world of the atom.”^
The Alliance, Acheson, and the Atom
Many Europeans viewed U.S. atomic power as the most 
promising element in plans for Western defense. Churchill 
called upon the Americans to bear the "awful atomic burden" 
bravely in the fight against tyranny, and assured Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson that the main guarantee of peace in
the world rested in the U.S. atomic arsenal. For his part.
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Acheson admitted that if the American nuclear deterrent 
had not been taken into account in the early years of the 
Atlantic Alliance the task of defense would have seemed 
impossible. The reliance on the atomic option may explain, 
in part, why Acheson emphatically insisted during the 
hearings on ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty that 
large contingents of U.S. troops would not be stationed in 
Europe.^ Reliance on atomic weapons, however, would not be 
the official policy of the United States.
Although in general terms. President Harry Truman 
believed that the power of the atom would be of "key impor­
tance in the search for a peaceful world," he was one of the 
foremost proponents of strong conventional forces within 
NATO.^ His confidence in atomic deterrence* had been tem­
pered even before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 
by a report of the President*s Air Policy Commission (known 
as the Finletter Commission) in January 1948. The Pinletter 
Report noted that wars of the future would, indeed, almost 
certainly be fought with the new weapons of mass destruction, 
but in sobering terms the commission reported that "other 
nations" were bound to develop these weapons and estimated 
that by 1952 they would be able to produce them in large
Definitions of starred items appear in Appendix A
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quantities. The commission also estimated that by the same 
year these nations might be able to produce missiles capable 
of delivering atomic bombs to the U.S. mainland. The com­
mission recommended that the U.S. begin an immediate, massive 
military buildup and concluded that since weapons technology 
had eliminated the protection once afforded the United 
States by its geographical isolation the buildup would have
4to continue indefinitely into the future. The commission 
suggested that military spending be increased steadily from 
the $10 billion expended in 1947 to $18 billion by 1952, 
with emphasis being placed on procurements for the Air 
Force.^
The Finletter Report, together with a similarly bleak 
submission made by a presidential advisory group on military 
training (the Compton Commission) produced a strong impact 
within the administration * s military planning structure.
In October 1948, the National Security Council formulated a 
new policy (NSC/68) based on the premise that Soviet posses­
sion of large quantities of atomic weapons together with 
their overwhelming superiority in conventional forces would 
create a serious military imbalance in Europe. To redress 
the imbalance a large number of additional ground troops 
would be needed and efforts to unify the U.S. armed forces 
would have to be initiated.^ It was estimated that the 
maximum year of danger— when advances in the Soviets* 
atomic weapons would allow her to take advantage of her
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superior conventional forces-»—would be 1954. A con­
certed expansion of conventional strength would have to 
be undertaken to assure that the Western Allies would be
7prepared to meet a conventional attack by that time. 
Convincing the U.S. Congress and European Allies that these 
new forces were needed, however, might well have been impos­
sible "had not the Russians been stupid enough to have
Qinstigated the attack against Korea."
The effect of the Korean invasion on the Atlantic 
Alliance was profound. Within a year U.S. military forces 
had doubled; additional American troops were sent to Europe, 
and eventually U.S. strategic nuclear forces were moved into 
England to deter Soviet military action in Western Europe.
In the long run, the Korean war acted as the catalyst for 
inclusion of Germany in NATO’s defense structure.
One of the obvious lessons of the Korean war was that 
U.S. atomic weapons would not deter communist military adven­
tures. The stationing of the American nuclear "retardation 
force" in Britain, however, convinced some NATO planners 
that the strain which would be placed on the struggling 
economies of Western Europe by a massive conventional build­
up could be alleviated by the substitution of an atomic
qdeterrent to the Soviet threat.
The communist invasion of Korea helped persuade the 
U.S. Congress to appropriate the funds required to implement
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NSC/68- Representatives of the administration made it 
clear to Congressional leaders that the safety of the United 
States would require "balanced collective forces" stationed 
in Europe "to continue to deter aggression after our atomic 
advantage has been diminished-"^^ By June 1951, American 
policymakers had conceded the fact that in case of major war 
with Russia there was no reasonable doubt that the United 
States "would have to sustain a heavy attack of atomic 
b o m b s . A m e r i c a n  leaders were beginning to view the nu­
clear deterrent as incredible; European leaders would soon 
join them in this perception.
U.S. concern regarding dependence on atomic weapons 
was apparently reflected in the force goals set by the North 
Atlantic Council which met in Lisbon in February 1952. The 
Council agreed that NATO should field fifty divisions in 
Europe by the end of the year, seventy-five by the end of
1953, and an ambitious ninety—six divisions by the end of 
121954. It soon became clear to all involved, however, that
actual deployments would fall far short of these goals. In
part this can be attributed to the European belief that "a
new wind was blowing from the West" (i.e., presidential
candidate Dwight Eisenhower), but the major cause was
"the growing belief that military plans were outgrowing the
1 3economic means to execute them."
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New developments in military hardware and strategy also 
added to the Europeans" reluctance to bolster their conven­
tional forces. Nine months after the Lisbon meeting the 
United States exploded the first hydrogen bomb. The remark­
able military applications of nuclear fission were now over­
shadowed by the fantastic applications of nuclear fusion. 
Would the Soviets be able to close this enormous atomic gap? 
The need for substantial conventional forces seemed even more 
remote, and the mystique of the atom bomb faded as specific 
data revealing the true potential of the hydrogen device 
became public.
The process of demystification continued as U.S. forces
conducted live—round testing of the new atomic cannon in the
final months of 1952. Following one test, members of an
observation team from the Atomic Energy Commission commented
that the new kind of atomic warfare that now could be waged
was "very promising as a means of halting aggression without
the risk of destroying large parts of the world in the 
14process-** If strategic uses of nuclear weapons were 
becoming less credible as Soviet stockpiles increased, per­
haps the use of tactical nuclear forces would reduce military 
expenditures.
Implementation of programs for atomic weapons used on 
the tactical level had not officially been given serious 
consideration during the first few years following Hiroshima
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and Nagasaki. It was not until 1949 that General Omar 
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, authorized 
development of tactical nuclear weapons- Two years later, 
the United States had tested small, one kiloton devices that 
could be used in tactical situations. The new, low-yield 
devices so impressed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commis­
sion, Gordon Dean, that he commented:
We can with complete justification treat the 
tactical atom —  divested of the awesome cloak of 
destruction which surrounds it in its strategic 
role —  in the same manner other weapons aretreated.15
As new military tactics were devised, the revolutionary, 
and rather bizarre, nature of the new weapons became clear. 
Instead of attacking an enemy’s weakest point, nuclear 
warriors might well attack at the strongest. Mobility became 
a necessity; concentrations were prohibited- Field commanders 
in the new age would be forced to deal with the tactics of 
"atomic envelopment" and obliged to consider options as 
undesirable as "defense of ground z e r o . A l t h o u g h  Secretary 
Acheson acknowledged that the atomic artillery shell might 
provide part of the answer to the Soviet threat on the ground, 
after the Korean war he maintained that large contingents 
of ground forces were an absolutely essential element in the 
defense of Europe- His final memorandum to President Truman 
urged that additional forces be deployed on the European 
continent- These forces never materialized-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Dwight Eisenhower and the Economy 
of Nuclear Power
The Dwight Eisenhower administration had come to 
power promising substantial cuts in the military budget of 
the united States- It proposed to do so in a variety of 
ways. Rather than proceeding with the massive military 
expansion which the^ Pinletter Commission had considered 
essential, the new President called for a more gradual, 
longer term program of defense spending- This "long haul" 
approach would emphasize appropriating resources in such a 
manner that the maximum deterrent would be provided at the 
lowest cost- The spokesman for U.S. foreign policy. Secre­
tary of State John Foster Dulles, insisted that it was folly
to spend so much on the military that it threatened to
17bankrupt the country.
Before taking office, Dulles had made clear the means 
by which the United States would effectively and economically 
counter the Soviet threat- Matching Russia man-for-man and 
tank—for-tank would lead to economic disaster- America 
would, instead, "develop the will and organize the means to 
retaliate instantly against open aggression by the Red 
armies.--by means of our choosing." Those "means" would
be atomic weapons, which used on a massive scale possessed
1 8the power to halt aggression. On the surface it appeared 
that once in power, Eisenhower and Dulles would rely on a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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policy of "massive retaliation” as the foundation of U.S.
military strategy.
In practice, however, "massive retaliation" was little 
more than a highly rhetorical restatement of the already 
established nuclear deterrent posture of the United States 
and Atlantic Alliance. It had been well understood that 
the policy of the Truman administration posed a real, nuclear- 
based threat against Soviet aggression in Western Europe. 
Eisenhower's initial correspondence with Dulles had
expressed reservations regarding exclusive reliance on
19strategic nuclear forces, and Dulles was careful to point 
out that "massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is
not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked
20under all circumstances." The administration was acutely 
aware of the distinction between local and general war, and 
Dulles often stressed the need for "flexibility of the means 
to deter.
The "massive retaliation" posture did, however, play an 
important role in Alliance politics- Viewed in the light 
of the Dulles rhetoric, nuclear deterrence took on an unreal 
air, and since the new doctrine was also supposed to provide 
protection for U.S. allies in Asia, deterrence became some­
what deflated. As a result, the credibility of U.S. nuclear 
commitments was weakened. It has also been suggested that 
discussions of the doctrine gave vogue to the idea that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2 2conventional arms were obsolete. In any case, the doctrine
was quite short-lived, and a "new look" was on line by 1954.
The "new look" policy was predicated on an October 1953
National Security Council document (NSC-162/2) which called
upon the armed services to draw up future plans with the
assumption that nuclear weapons could and would be used in
23limited war situations.
In Europe the "new look" would reduce U.S. conventional 
forces; the focus would be on nuclear weapons, both strategic 
and tactical. This new emphasis on tactical nuclear devices 
was hardly likely to encourage European governments to meet 
their chronically unfulfilled troop commitments, especially 
since short-range atomic weapons conceived in the Truman ad­
ministration, were immediately available as a foundation for 
the nuclear focus. Tactical nuclear weapons were quickly 
deployed in Europe.
The "new look" would also dramatically increase expend­
itures on Intercontinental and Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs and IRBMs) armed with nuclear warheads.
Budget outlays for these systems increased from $3 million 
in fiscal year (FY) 1953 to over $160 million in FY 1955.
The earlier rhetoric had cooled somewhat, but the shift to 
increased reliance on nuclear forces had begun in earnest.
Following the lead of the United States, the North 
Atlantic Council in 1954 approved plans for NATO’s Military
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Committee to devise a strategy based on the first use of 
nuclear weapons. The Council acknowledged that the Lisbon 
force goals would not be met, and encouraged the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons as a means of redressing the con­
ventional s h o r t f a l l T h e  development of more accurate 
guidance systems in combination with lighter, smaller yield 
warheads increased the appeal of tactical weapons- Since the 
atomic cannon, and the Regulus, Honest John, Corporal, and 
Matador missiles had already been deployed on the continent, 
discussions regarding the new policy were rather academic.
The debate that ensued, however, did propel the "nuclear
sharing" issue to the forefront of Alliance policy formu-
25lation issues.
The new deployments reflected the administration’s
willingness to consider, both privately and publicly
use of nuclear weapons in tactical roles. Dulles advised
Eisenhower that the only effective defense of Quemoy and
Matsu would entail the use of nuclear devices against
mainland airfields. When asked by the press if the United
States would use tactical atomic weapons in a general war
in Asia, Eisenhower responded that they would be used, but
only against military targets. The President hoped to use
this public statement to convince the Chinese communists
that America was determined to protect Western interests in 
2 6the region* The primary role of nuclear weapons in the 
U.S. arsenal was still deterrence, but serious discussions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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within the administration concerning possible tactical uses
2 7in Korea, China, and at Dien Bien Phu did take place.
Two months after the promulgation of NSC-162/2, Presi­
dent Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" address at 
the United Nations. Designed to shock as well as persuade, 
the speech emphasized that unless international action was 
taken quickly, nuclear nations might soon lose.the ability 
to control even their own development of weapons. "The 
development has been such," he said, "that atomic weapons
have virtually achieved conventional status within our
28armed services•"
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Nathan Twining
proceeded on the assumption that all future wars would
involve nuclear weapons. At a Congressional hearing he
advised members of the Senate that a substantial reduction
in defense spending could be made if U.S. policy shifted to
a "new strategy built around the use of atomic weapons in
war." The United States, he maintained, could not afford to
finance both conventional and nuclear forces. The nuclear
option was the only way America could field effective forces
29"within a reasonable standard of financing." Apparently 
the Senators were impressed; nearly half of the 195 7 defense 
budget was allocated to the Air Force while expenditures 
for the Army*s more conventional forces declined.
By 195,7 "graduated deterrence" had become a dominant 
factor in America's military policy. In case of armed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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conflict, American leaders would now be provided with a
wider range of options on both the conventional and nuclear
levels. The strategic nuclear stockpile would be held in
reserve. Responding to new advances in Soviet technology
and to Russian "missile rattling" during the 1956 Suez
crisis, the U.S. proposed strengthening the deterrent by
the deployment of state-of-the-art IRBMs and the estab—
30lishment of nuclear stockpiles in Europe. The weapons 
would be controlled by the Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe, that is, by an American. The British had already 
agreed, on a bilateral basis, to deploy the missiles, but 
other allies exhibited generally negative reactions to the 
proposal. In order to gain acceptance of the new deployment 
plan it was necessary to include a concurrent proposal, 
suggested by the British, to hold simultaneous arms reduc­
tion talks with the Soviets. The opposition to Eisenhower * s 
IRBM proposal, made possible in large part by the strength­
ening of Western Europe’s economic and social structure 
which had occurred by 1957, signaled the end of America’s 
ability to dictate allied nuclear policy.
U.S. policymakers also found their nuclear policies 
being influenced by other elements apparently beyond their 
control. In 1951, Secretary Acheson had commented that 
maintenance of the American military position required the 
military to "constantly search for, and find, new weapons
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and new techniques in the air, at sea, and on the land.” -̂
During the first four years of the Eisenhower admin­
istration the proliferation of new military techniques and 
hardware was astounding. As a military officer, Eisenhower 
had been comforted by methods that were "tried and true;" 
as president he faced the disquieting situation in which a 
new slogan held sway, "if it works, it's obsolete." Despite 
reservations concerning the progress of military science, 
however, he was forced to concede, "no longer could we
afford the folly, so often indulged in in the past, of
32beginning each war with the weapons of the last."
As new technologies came on-line American policymakers 
in both the administrative and legislative branches became 
obsessed with military hardware. Technological advances by 
the Soviets created an imagined "bomb gap" in the mid-1950s, 
and by the end of the decade, the U.S. faced the notorious 
"missile gap." Sputnik made headlines; almost unnoticed was 
the historic Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 during which 
the Soviets announced a policy of peaceful coexistence, 
acknowledged that war was not inevitable, and renounced the 
oppressive tactics of Josef Stalin.
For Eisenhower, military technology had become an 
issue of prime importance, and by the end of his presidency 
he had come to realize that, increasingly, political decisions 
were being dominated by military considerations, and military 
policies had become the slave of unbridled technology. His
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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final address to the nation warned:
In the councils of government we must guard against 
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial 
complex. The potential for the disasterous rise 
of misplaced power exists and will persist.
A second admonition cautioned that
...in holding scientific research and discovery 
in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to 
the equal and opposite danger that public policy 
could itself become tbe captive of a scientific- 
technological elite.
His warnings were probably too late.
Robert McNamara and John Kennedy —  
More is Better
The policy of "graduated deterrence" had evolved 
simultaneously and somewhat symbiotically with related 
theories proposed by academicians on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Limited nuclear war was becoming fashionable. 
Approaches to the study of this new fashion were varied, 
Herman Kahn, for example, envisioned a minimum of forty-four 
possible levels of conflict; twenty-four of them were above 
the nuclear t h r e s h o l d . C o m i n g  rather late in these 
studies, Henry Kissinger * s Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy (195 7) drew heavily on previous theories and became 
the most widely read treatise on the subject.
Conventional war, Kissinger wrote, would soon become 
"unnatural," and since war between nations which possessed
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nuclear weapons would almost certainly involve their use,
policies should be devised to ensure that nuclear exchanges
35take place on the less-than—total level. Limited nuclear
war would never be truly desirable, but in the nuclear age
it might offer the best alternative available. Limited
nuclear war would be the Alliance's most effective strategy
and utilize the West's "special skills to best advantage.
Kissinger maintained that with proper tactics the destructive
impact of tactical weapons might be held to tolerable 
37levels. Of utmost importance, however, if the West wished
to avoid disaster, the Soviets must not be allowed to use
38their nuclear weapons before NATO unleashed theirs. The 
Allies must be prepared to cross the nuclear threshold first.
Pronouncements of this type from Harvard professors were 
unlikely to send Kremlin leaders scrambling to their fallout 
shelters, yet Kissinger and many other apostles of limited 
nuclear war did influence the Kennedy administration sub­
stantially. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a 
dominant member of the Kennedy cabinet, came to the Defense 
Department with very little military experience. His heavy 
reliance on several members of the Rand "think tank" assured 
the prospects that his policies, and through him, the policies 
of the President would reflect the recently popularized
O Qlimited war theories. In a public interview which was 
printed in March 1962, President Kennedy left little doubt
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that in the defense of Europe, "...come what may...we must 
be prepared to use the nuclear weapons at the start."
Kennedy also made it clear that tactical nuclear weapons 
would play an important role, "...what is important is that 
if you use these weapons you have control of their use. What 
you need is control, flexibility, a choice....
The "first use" policy described by Kennedy and subse­
quently by several members of his administration was certainly 
not new. The emphasis placed on the policy, and the public 
manner in which it was enunciated, however, did influence 
Alliance thinking. It may also have substantially altered 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soor 
after the Kennedy interview. Communist Party Chairman Nikita 
Khrushchev commented, "Your president has made a very bad 
mistake for which he will have to pay. He has said that 
you will be the first to use the bomb."^^
"First use" was one element in Kennedy’s overall strat­
egy of "flexible response." Like "massive retaliation" much 
of "flexible response" consisted of new rhetoric used to 
express old ideas. In at least one important area, however, 
the new policy was a substantial departure from that of 
previous administrations. While delivering the commencement 
address at the University of Michigan, Secretary McNamara 
revealed that U.S. strategy in general war would "be 
approached in much the same way that more conventional 
operations have been regarded in the past." More specifically.
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American nuclear forces would concentrate on the "destruction 
of the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian pop­
ulation.""^^ Since this new "counterforce" strategy was 
based on the assumption that in order to be effective, U.S. 
missiles which were launched must strike unlaunched Soviet 
missiles, McNamara’s Ann Arbor speech added credibility to 
the "first strike" posture.
Another important element essential for "flexible 
response" was a substantial increase in conventional forces 
stationed in Europe. McNamara believed that additional troop 
deployments were especially critical following Prance’s with­
drawal from the integrated force structure in 1967. Congres­
sional concern that the newly proposed deployments of tactical 
nuclear weapons would lower the nuclear threshold were count­
ered by administration claims that deployment of additional 
ground troops would raise the threshold to its former level.
In December 1967, the NATO Council officially embraced a 
defense strategy based on "a flexible balanced range of
appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all
43levels of aggression or threats of aggression" The expend­
itures necessary to increase conventional forces substantially, 
however, again failed to materialize. In fact. President 
Lyndon Johnson "temporarily" withdrew a total df twenty 
thousand troops from Europe between 1967 and 1968. U.S. 
tactical forces were increased 60 percent during the
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Kennedy years, and had doubled by the time Lyndon Johnson 
left office.
The continued reliance on nuclear weapons in general, 
and tactical weapons in particular, can be attributed in 
some part to the pressures placed on American conventional 
forces by the Vietnam war. European reluctance to contribute 
more troops to NATO’s defense, however, was based on 
arguments —  usually unstated, but always prevalent —  which 
had become as entrenched as the Alliance’s bureaucracy. The 
cost of fielding conventional forces was prohibitive, espe­
cially when compared to the economic firepower provided by 
nuclear weapons.
Many Europeans also believed that stronger conventional
forces would raise the nuclear threshold and weaken the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrents In 1965, German
Minister of Defense Kai-Uwe von Hassel made the European
position clear; while "flexible response" might become
official Alliance policy, it "must not be interpreted to
mean that the so called atomic threshold can be raised unduly
high...." The Alliance, he asserted, must be prepared to wage
44war with a large range of atomic weapons.
As the 1957 IRBM decision had demonstrated, Europeans 
were becoming increasingly uneasy about U.S. dominance of 
nuclear decisions within the Alliance. The Kennedy admin­
istration attempted to assuage these fears by assigning
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nuclear armed Polaris submarines to the NATO command. The 
weapons on these submarines, however, were still controlled 
by the United States. Great Britain was equally unwilling 
to allow its nuclear forces to be controlled by other Allies. 
Eventually, the nuclear sharing issue would be a major 
factor leading to the French withdrawal from the unified 
command.
Secretary McNamara was determined to retain veto 
power over the use of American nuclear weapons by the Alli­
ance; if U.S. weapons were to be used against Soviet forces, 
American permission would be required. But McNamara opposed 
the creation of separate nuclear forces which would be 
produced and controlled by each Alliance member. In 1965, 
West Germany pushed for inclusion of U.S. missiles, designed 
to counter the latest deployment of Soviet state-of-the-art 
IRBMs, within the structure of the proposed nuclear Multi­
lateral Force (MLF). The Germans envisioned these sea-based 
missiles as a "new, primarily European component of the deter­
rent."^^ The United States had originally proposed the 
creation of the MLF, in rather vague terms, but as discus­
sions of specific issues leading to MLF implementation 
proceeded, opposition arose from a variety of sources. The 
U.S. Congress revived its traditional opposition to nuclear 
sharing, Britain expressed serious reservations, and France
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objected to inclusion of West Germany in the proposed force. 
Many officials in the Kennedy administration also had second 
thoughts, and the MLF proposal was permanently placed on a 
back burner.
In its place the United States proposed the creation of 
a new NATO committee which would formulate Alliance nuclear 
policy. Although many Europeans believed that the proposed 
consultative approach to nuclear sharing provided a very 
poor substitute for the MLF * s plan, a policy group was formed 
and soon evolved into the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).
Given the more formal structure in which to influence Alli^^ 
ance decisions, the Europeans (minus France which did not 
participate in the NPG) could push even harder for improve­
ments in NATO’s nuclear force posture.
Considerations of a technical nature also created 
pressures on the Americans for additional deployments. A 
number of weapons systems designed for tactical use had been 
initiated under the Eisenhower administration; when these 
systems came on-line, the U.S. had nowhere to deploy them 
except Europe (and perhaps Japan or Korea, although ration­
ales for substantial Asian deployments seemed rather shallow). 
Echoing Eisenhower’s concern, McNamara complained, "we are
borne along by the accelerating pace of science and 
.46technology. '*
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Henry Kissinger —  Technocracy 
and the Alliance
Policymakers assuming their responsibilities in the
administration of President Richard Nixon were confronted
with technical data which was bound to discourage even the
most stout-hearted. "Counterforce" strategies were
abandoned— in fact, they had been disguarded during the
Johnson administration— but the Soviets had amassed a
missile force large enough to kill over 50 million Americans
from the immediate effects of a second strike.» Soviet
ICBK guidance systems could now consistently deliver
warheads to within six hundred meters of their target; an
essential component of U.S. strategic forces, the underground
47Minut«nan system, was threatened by a new technology.
Lead times for building advanced, highly complex
weapons systems of the 19 70s averaged five years, compounding
defense planning p r o b l e m s . T h e  Nixon administration’s
contribution to nuclear doctrine, "strategic sufficiency,"
was based on plans which targeted both civilian and military
facilities in the Soviet Union. Implementation of the
doctrine, however, was to prove very difficult. Operational
plans "by the time they were developed had been overtaken
49by advances in technology."
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger explained the 
new "strategic sufficiency" doctrine in terms which veteran
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members of Congress had heard many times before. The new 
strategy was designed to "introduce flexibility” and to 
offer the President a large number of "options” in case.of 
an attack on the United States or the Alliance. The Sec­
retary suggested that the new strategy might even be carried 
out using existing weapons s y s t e m s . A s s u m i n g  the Soviets 
undertook selective attacks on American land-based ICBMs, 
"strategic sufficiency” would provide operational plans so 
that the President could respond in a manner which would not 
elicit a massive counterstrike against U.S. population 
centers. The proposed targeting doctrine, "selective 
response,” would add to deterrence by making U.S. policy more 
c r e d i b l e . I n  essence, "strategic sufficiency” was a plan for 
waging a limited nuclear war on the strategic level.
A growing sentiment in Congress to reduce military
spending was reflected in President Nixon * s first budget
proposal which called for a cut of S5 billion from the
previous year's military expenditures. In real terms,
defense spending consistently decreased during the Nixon
years. Conventional forces were to feel the brunt of the
new budgetary trends. U.S. military personnel levels
during Nixon’s first term fell from 3.5 million to just
over 2.2 million. Seven hundred thousand American troops
were redeployed from foreign assignments back to the United 
52States. The majority of those reassigned were taken from 
Asian theaters, but the redeployments and reductions
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adversely affected further attempts to persuade European 
governments to increase their conventional forces.
Two changes in policy allowed the drastic cuts in 
American conventional forces. Before the Nixon adminis­
tration, American military planners believed that the 
United States should be prepared to fight two wars simul­
taneously in Europe and Asia. The President proposed a one 
and one-half war fighting option which allowed conventional 
forces to be maintained at a substantially lower level. A 
related policy initiative, the "Nixon Doctrine,” also contri­
buted to this trend. The doctrine, apparently proposed in 
an innocent attempt to provide reporters with a bit of
5 3journalistic fodder on a slow news day, offered the 
employment of a nuclear umbrella as protection for friendly 
Asian nations. For their part, Asian governments would be 
expected to provide for their own conventional defense needs. 
This restatement of the Dulles assurances to provide U.S. 
nuclear deterrence in Asia again diluted the credibility 
of strategic deterrence in the eyes of the Europeans.
Nixon * s adviser on national security matters warned,
"we are in danger of sliding into a period of relying on 
massive retaliation even though this is absurd." Urging 
a reassessment of administration policy, Kissinger continued, 
"Our general purpose forces* must be looked at...they are 
the way we are seen by our allies— they are the contact
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
and the r e a l i t y . T h e  formation of America’s all volunteer 
army convinced many Europeans that U.S. troop levels would 
remain low for a considerable period of time, and many 
Europeans used its formation to justify their refusal to 
deploy additional conventional forces.
On the official level, the Nixon administration endorsed 
retention of the main principles of NATO defense plans: deter­
rence based on a wide spectrum of capabilities, a continuation 
of the "flexible response" doctrine, and maintenance of the 
forward defense strategy.* A new assessment of Soviet con­
ventional force levels, made by the Americans, pointed to 
the possibility that a relatively small increase in European
forces would be sufficient to balance the conventional equa-
55tlon on the continent. The Europeans, however, were still 
concerned that too strong a conventional force would under-
C  flmine the credibility of strategic deterrence*
Privately, U.S. officials in both the State and Defense 
Departments were uneasy with NATO defense strategy. While 
the European Allies insisted on a guaranteed early use of 
tactical weapons, they were understandably reluctant to 
have them detonated on their own territory. Americans with­
in the military planning structure preferred a policy which 
would establish a clear line of demarcation, a firebreak, 
between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons.
Disputes arose in the NPG during 1969 as Europeans, led by
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British Defense Minister Dennis Healey, insisted that NATO
ground troops could only hold against a Soviet attack for
a matter of days, and that early use of tactical nuclear
weapons was an essential element of any defense strategy.
Members of the NPG finally agreed that the use of tactical
nuclear weapons would be a part of NATO * s defense policies
but no specific plans for their use were formulated. Upon
his return from the NPG meeting Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird reported to the President that the traditional gulf
between U.S. and European views of Alliance strategies was
5 7as wide as ever.
That gulf found expression in Henry Kissinger’s reveal­
ing comment regarding European defense strategy;
Their secret hope, which they never dared to ar­
ticulate, was that - the defense of_Europe would be 
conducted as an intercontinental nuclear exchange 
over their heads.58
Undoubtedly, part of the problem lay in the fact that 
what the United States considered tactical, Europeans viewed 
as strategic, and what concerned America on the strategic 
level could be examined tactically in Europe. Perhaps the 
secret hope of American planners was that they could use 
Europe as a battleground on which to challenge the communist 
threat.
Another aspect of the problem stemmed from the inabil­
ity of Alliance members to formulate specific plans regarding 
the actual use of tactical nuclear weapons* Since disputes
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on the doctrinal level were nearly constant, specific
planning was impossible. Laird, Schlesinger, and Kissinger
all expressed dismay that concrete nuclear warfighting plans
did not exist. On at least three occassions the President
publicly called for a resolution of the problem which was
posed by the existence of seven thousand tactical weapons
59in Europe with no effective plans to use them.
Although relatively few American tactical nuclear sys­
tems were introduced into Europe during the Nixon/Ford 
administration, development and testing continued. A new 
artillery round with greater range and more adaptability was 
produced. General Andrew Goodpaster, commander of NATO 
forces, urged that funds be made available for its deploy­
ment. Noting that "artillery is normally employed in close 
proximity to the front line," Goodpaster stated that the 
shell would provide a command advantage against "time- 
sensitive targets.
This statement was most disquieting for those members 
of Congress who were concerned with keeping the nuclear 
threshold as high as possible, for weapons which are designed 
to be used quickly and are stationed close to points of 
possible enemy attack are precisely those which are most 
likely to be used to cross the demarcation line between 
conventional and nuclear war. Expressing the fears felt 
by some of his colleagues, long-time veteran of armed forces 
affairs, Missouri Senator Stewart Symington commented, "the
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more you lower the kilotonnage of these weapons, the 
more you disperse them...the greater the chance of their 
going off and the world blowing u p . D e v e l o p m e n t  of the 
new shell proceeded.
General Goodpaster's call for small yield, more accurate 
warheads was also answered by development funds appropriated 
for the Pershing II missile during the Nixon administration. 
The Pershing ll with more than ten times the accuracy of the 
older model, Pershing I-A, met NATO*s requirements well. 
Another system, perhaps even better suited to Alliance needs, 
was beginning to make its way into the U.S. tactical nuclear 
arsenal through a rather circuitous route.
In 1971, Congress had given the Air Force $10 million 
for development of a Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) 
missile. The small vehicle was relatively inexpensive and 
possessed an intermediate range capacity. It would be 
launched from B-52 bombers and fulfill a dual role of con­
fusing enemy radar and carrying an explosive warhead. By 
1973, progress on the decoy mode was satisfactory. The Air 
Force, however, had refused to proceed with the development 
of the vehicle in the armed mode. Members of Congress pro­
tested, but the Air Force continued to ignore the dual nature 
of SCAD. The reason for this intransigence was not difficult 
to determine. Used in the "stand-off mode" the missile 
could be launched from a bomber, penetrate enemy airspace, 
and act as a strategic delivery vehicle. SCAD would perform
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the same function as the proposed B— 1 bomber, and the 
Air Force was not willing to jeopardize its manned bomber 
program by proceeding with the smaller, much less expensive 
c r a f t . H e a d s  of each of the armed services were reluctant
to accept new strategies that threatened their ’’procurement
6 3enterprises.”
Concurrent with Air Force development of SCAD, the Navy 
was testing its Strategic Cruise Missile* (SCM), a missile 
very similar to the SCAD. Since the SCM was to be launched 
from submarines, it possessed little utility as a decoy.
Naval research on the proposed weapons system centered on 
advances in guidance technology. A terrain profile matching 
system would distinguish the Navy’s cruise from those 
that had come before it by providing it with remarkable 
accuracy.
Although neither the Air Force nor Navy programs for 
the proposed cruise missiles were initiated with the intent 
of producing a land based system, the ground launched version 
of the N avy’s Tomahawk SCM would eventually be deployed by 
the Air Force and play a prominent role in NATO's nuclear 
modernization program. Development of specific military 
plans for the Tomahawk’s use, however, would lag far behind 
the technology that had created this new class of weapon.
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Conclusion
From the beginning of the atomic age, U.S. policymakers 
have been confronted with questions for which there appeared 
to be no satisfactory answers. A few U.S. officials, like 
George F. Kennan, were quick to note the dangers inherent 
in the reliance on atomic weapons which he believed were 
"an infirm and questionable element in our military pos­
ture. Soviet developments in the atomic field seemed to
make suggestions that the U.S. abandon its nuclear programs 
unrealistic. Deep mistrust and ingrained animosity between 
the two major powers tended to preclude policy options which 
might have helped control the early proliferation of nuclear 
weapons systems. Each new technology was perceived as a 
threat to the precarious balance which soon came to be 
based on theories of mutual and massive destruction. As the 
possibilities for viable options, which had been few to 
begin with, decreased, morbid results ensued. In 1965, the 
Pentagon estimated that assured destruction would be achieved 
if U.S. nuclear forces could kill one— fourth to one—third of 
the Soviet population. Three years later, successful mass 
destruction was defined as one-fifth to one-fourth of the 
population killed.
In the United States, fears of Soviet technology became 
manifest in a strange and remarkably persistent form.
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♦•gapmania.” Each new durge in technology was matched by 
another, and each new administration, unable to come to 
grips with the basically insoluble dilemmas it faced, de­
manded that it be given more flexibility, more options 
with which to control the increasingly dangerous situation 
In most cases the options and flexibility were provided by 
the next group of weapons to come on-line.
In the Western nations, increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons was accelerated by the refusal of Alliance leaders 
to finance relatively expensive conventional forces. The de­
fense policy of each American administration called for 
increases in both nuclear and conventional forces, but except 
for the initial NATO deployment made by the Truman adminis­
tration, no substantial increases in ground troops were made.
As American reliance on military hardware grew, U.S. 
foreign policy became myopic; Soviet-American relations 
increasingly came to be viewed in military terms. Certainly 
the unnecessary rhetoric and inflexible ideologies of both 
East and West contributed to additional tensions, but the 
core of the superpower confrontation became the race for 
superior weapons technology.
Situated between the two great powers. Western Europe 
could hope to remain on cordial terms with both heavily 
armed giants, but when threatened by the offspring of 
strategic nuclear policy, Europe too had learned to run for
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help into the ever-expanding arms of technology.
In 1977, as the new administration in America surveyed 
the international scene, respected and influential statesmen 
in Western Europe called for actions to redress the apparent 
imbalance which had been created by Soviet deployment of 
its newest intermediate-range missile, the S3—20. Thirty 
years of programs designed to assure maximum policy flexi­
bility would provide Jimmy Carter with a large variety of 
military options.
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CHAPTER II
STRATEGIC PARITY AND THE 
THEATER NUCLEAR THREAT
The weapons development programs which President Carter
inherited from previous administrations included the cruise
missile (in its various forms), the Pershing II, and the
Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), also known as the neutron
bomb. All could be categorized as tactical systems, and
all would play a major role in the debates on modernization
of NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear forces.
Carter’s natural propensity, however, was to refrain
from deploying any of these systems. Commenting on the
size of the superpowers’ arsenals, he maintained:
It was always obvious that both nations had far 
more weapons than would ever be needed to destroy 
every significant military installation and every 
civilian population center in the lands of its 
potential enemies-...
1Carter was committed to reductions in nuclear stockpiles.
Soviet strides toward strategic parity in the early 
1970s did not bode well for this commitment, but other 
events during the first half of the decade had offered 
some hope that reductions would be made in the area of 
theater nuclear weapons* (TNW). Pressures for a reassess­
ment of Alliance nuclear policy had sparked debates con­
cerning not only the level of forces involved, but also 
the viability of NATO’s tactical nuclear strategy.
41
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Some analysts believed that a large increase in the
numbers of tactical weapons in Europe, together with a sharp
reduction in their explosive yields would strengthen the
Alliance. Two Los Alamos scientists, R.G. Shreff1er and
W.S. Bennet, suggestedL that a force of 50,000 to 100,000
2small-yleld weapons should be deployed. On Capitol Hill, 
howevery there was a growing sentiment that many of the 
warheads already stationed in Europe should be removed.
Early Debates
During Senate hearing in the spring of 1974, Paul 
Warnke, who had served as Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
noted that the initial deployments of U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons, made in the "primitive days of nuclear strategic 
thinking," had been "automatic and unrationalized." He 
believed that the "deterrent purpose of tactical nuclear
♦»3weapons could be served by something like several hundred. 
Another defense analyst, also a former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, Alain Enthoven asserted that "tactical nuclear 
weapons cannot defend Europe; they can only destroy it." 
Enthoven testified that the useful purposes of tactical 
nuclear weapons could be satisfied with a total of one
4thousand warheads.
The growing concern over U.S. tactical nuclear policy 
was codified by the "Nunn Amendment" which was contained in
tions Act of 1974. In its original
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form, the amendment provided that the total number of 
tactical nuclear warheads in Europe could not be increased 
except in the event of imminent hostilities. In the final 
statute this freeze provision was limited to a period which 
would expire on June 30, 1975, approximately one year after 
the enactment of the bill. Other provisions of the amendment 
became law in their original form.
The new statute called on the Secretary of Defense to 
make a study concerning a "reduction in the number and type 
of warheads which are not essential for the defense structure 
fdr Western Europe," and to study "the overall concept for 
use of tactical nuclear weapons..." The Secretary was 
also instructed to take steps to develop a "rational and 
co-ordinated nuclear posture" for the NATO alliance. Find­
ings of the Secretary were to be reported to Congress by 
April 1975.^
The report maddated by Congress was prepared by Sec­
retary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, and presented an 
outline of Alliance nuclear policy in broad terms. The 
Secretary*̂ 3 report noted that tactical nuclear weapons 
were a critical component of NATO's deterrent posture.
The weapons also acted as a hedge against the possible 
failure of conventional forces. Theater nuclear forces 
(TNF) could serve to deter conventional attack by preventing 
the massing of enemy units. They added to the credibility
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Of the overall nuclear deterrent by providing nuclear weapons 
which^ because they could not reach Soviet territory, offered 
”a perceptively lower risk of escalation than the use of 
strategic nuclear forces.*» The report concluded that in 
limited numbers TNWs could also "serve the political purpose
gof showing NATO’s resolve."
The report emphasized the need for the Alliance to 
maintain a high nuclear threshold; conventional forces 
would have to be strengthened. Xf the threshold had to be 
crossed, however, TNPs would be a critical element in the 
attempt to avoid escalation in a war against Soviet forces 
which were prepared to wage a European conflict with "theater-
7wide, large-scale nuclear strikes." Of special importance 
to future debates oh the deployments of modernized TNPs was 
Schlesinger*s observation that parity on the strategic level 
placed added emphasis on the deterrent role of conventional
Qand theater nuclear forces.
This theme formed the basis of West German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt’s remarks concerning Alliance nuclear 
policy in his October 1977 address to members of the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). While 
the majority of his address examined essentially non-military 
aspects of security— economic development, access to raw 
materials, and social justice— the primary result of his 
comments was a revitalization of debate on NATO's theater
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nuclear policies* The speech linked superpower strategic 
parity to arms control agreements and explained the signif­
icance of this linkage to European security.
Schmidt observed that the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty (SALT) "codifies the nuclear strategic balance," and 
in doing so neutralized the Soviet and American strategic 
arsenals* "In Europe this magnifies the significance of 
the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical
9and conventional weapons." While Schmidt was careful to 
point out that further arms control negotiations between the 
superpowers were important to world security, he uarned that 
"we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that 
these negotiations do not neglect the component of NATO's 
deterrent strategy." He further cautioned that strategic 
talks confined to the superpowers would "inevitably impair 
the security of the Western European members of the Alli­
ance... if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of
"10military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations."
It may be argued that the Schmidt speech set a new, 
reinvigorated peace movement in motion, that it seriously 
strained Alliance cohesion, and that it caused the "mortal 
wounding of his own government."^^ At the very least, the 
October address increased U.S. policymakers' sensitivity to 
the European perspective on the tactical nuclear balance
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and focused public attention on the issue of TNF modern­
ization. This new public focus would eventually be an 
important factor in the complex intra—alliance debates and 
negotiations on modernization and deployment of the cruise 
and Pershing II missiles. American officials had hoped to 
conduct an appraisal of the Alliance’s tactical nuclear re­
quirements "out of the limelight, free from the pressures 
generated by intense public interest and scrutiny. After 
the Schmidt speech this was no longer possible."
The Alliance Evaluates the Threat
The military disparities which Schmidt had addressed 
in his October speech were references to the deployments of 
the Russians’ intermediate-range missile, the SS-20, and 
of their newest bomber, the Backfire. In the opinion of 
many Western defense analysts, both systems represented 
quantum leaps in Soviet TNF strength. According to some 
analysts the Backfire and SS-20 "placed at risk every sig­
nificant military and non-military target in Western 
E u r o p e . T h e  mobile, solid fuel SS-20 was a vast improve- 
ment over the stationary, bulky, liquid fuel SS-4 and SS-5. 
The new system's accuracy was four times that of the older 
models, and its range, according to some estimates, would 
allow it to hit NATO bases in Iceland and the Azores.
The SS-20 launcher could be reloaded, allowing for a
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sustained military campaign, and each missile contained 
three independently targeted warheads.
Within the Alliance’s formal structure evaluation of 
the threat posed by the Soviets’ new weapons, and debate 
concerning appropriate allied responses would take place 
primarily in the newly created High Level Group (HLG). The 
HLG had been formed as an outgrowth of NATO’s Long Term 
Defense Program <LTDP) which had been outlined in directives 
issued in May 1977, The most highly publicised component 
of the fifteen year LTDP was the commitment of member nations 
to an annual increase of approximately 3 percent in each of 
their defense budgets. The exact requirement of the real 
term increase (i.e., the increase after inflation was 
taken into account) had been intentionally formulated in 
vague terms, but most NATO officials agreed that increases 
of less than 2.8 percent would not meet the requirements.
The LTDP was designed to redress chronic Alliance short­
comings which ’’cut across almost every key area of military 
concern, from command and control, logistics, force structure 
and deployment, to readiness and reinforcement capabilities.”^^ 
The last item listed on the LTDP listcof ten ’’actions areas” 
was theater nuclear force modernization, and in October 1977 
the HLG was created to study this specific area of Alliance 
nuclear policy. The group’s agenda was set by Pentagon 
officials who proposed four broad avenues of possible action.
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The first option suggested was to make no overt response 
to the Russian deployments. A second option would be the de­
ployments of additional, modernized battlefield nuclear 
weapons which would not' be able to strike at Soviet,territory, 
The third choice presented was the emplacement of a modest 
long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF)* in Western Europe, 
and the final American proposal envisioned a massive LRTNF 
development capable of both counterforce and countervalue 
strikes against the Soviet Union.
In February 1978, the HLG made its preliminary determi­
nation. The "no response" option had been quickly rejected, 
as members agreed that the new Soviet threat had to be coun­
tered. The group consensus was that the Soviet Union must 
be the target of any new NATO deployment. One Alliance 
official noted, "the Poles are not enemies, they are vic­
tims Since battlefield weapons could not damage targets 
on Russian territory this option was a b a n d o n e d . P r o p o s a l s  
for the installation of large numbers of LRTNFs were rejected 
on both political and military grounds. The HLG maintained 
that too large a force stationed in Europe would have the 
effect of decoupling the U.S strategic nuclear force from 
NATO's defense structure. A large deployment would also be 
likely to prove provocative not only to the Soviets, but 
also to Western European elites who were seeking detente with 
the East. The initial recommendation of the eleven nation
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HLG would be for a modest deployment of missiles capable of
17threatening Soviet territory. The Pershing II and Ground 
Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) would soon emerge as the prime 
candidates to fill the role prescribed by the HLG.
Large segments of the allied defense establish­
ment perceived the high technology of the cruise missile 
as the optimum solution to a wide variety of problems. 
President Carter wondered if the expensive B-1 bomber would 
be a wise investment; "was there a better alternative? Yes
there was! A swarm of cruise missiles, once launched,
T Acould not be intercepted*.." Carter’s enthusiasm for the 
application of cruise technology focused on the strategic 
level, the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). In Europe, 
howevery "military planners were fascinated" with the pos­
sibilities of the cruise used in tactical applications.
For the most part, officials at the high levels of the 
Carter administration believed that European enthusiasm 
for the cruise was misplaced. THE GLCM would probably be 
considerably more expensive than originally estimated, and 
the land-based system would complicate arms control negotia­
tions with the Soviets.^^ But while American representatives
to the Alliance were trying to convince London and Bonn that
21the GLCM had "only limited application for NATO," the 
Department of Defense was attempting to persuade Congress 
that a high priority should be placed on the ground launched
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22version of the cruise. By the time the final HLG decision
on GLCM deployment was made in 1979, General Dynamics, the
prime contractor for the system, would be conducting tests
<apparently on its own initiative) to study the feasability
of using the GLCM as a reconnaissance vehicle and as an
23unmanned attack aircraft.. Given the strong support for
the GLCM in Europe and in the American defense establishment,
it was almost certain to be selected as part of any TNF
modernization. Selection of the Pershing TI as part of the
new force, however, was considerably more in doubt. The
limited range of the Pershing under development would not
meet the criteria set forth by the HLG.
Development of the advanced Pershing had been initiated
in an attempt to implement the Alliance strategy of "flexible
response.” Studies had been initiated in the late 1960s
to determine what types of systems would best enhance NATO’s
theater nuclear posture. One study, conducted by the sole
source contractor for the Pershing I, concluded that an
updated model of the Pershing would do the job nicely. The
new Pershing would have the same maximum range as the Pershing
I-A, approximately four hundred miles, but warhead^accuracy
24would be increased substantially.
In February 1970, Martin Marietta, the Pershing contrac­
tor, submitted an unsolicited proposal for the development 
of a potentially highly accurate radar directed guidance
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system. A year later the initial contract for radar develop­
ment was awarded, and in January 1972 the Army granted a $10
million contract to Martin for advanced development of the
25guidance system. The Pershing II first appeared as a 
separate defense budget line item in 1974, and Congress 
promptly reduced funding for the new reentry component of 
the system on grounds that Congress doubted the need for 
a European deployment and that if the system were to be 
used, the United States should not bear the total cost of 
the project. Since the Array had already awarded Martin a 
$19.8 million contract for further development (without 
prior Congressional approval) no momentum on the project was 
lost.^®
Over the next several years. Congress, having been
**repeatedly reassured that the Army was not building a
new strategic weapon, ** continued to fund development of the
2 7new missile system. During Senate hearings on the FY 1978 
budget the Pershing project manager insisted, "there is no 
change in the range...a conscious decision was made to retain 
the four hundred mile range." Although new propellants and 
improved propulsion components could be used to increase the 
Pershing’s striking distance, the director noted that retain­
ing the old range "avoids the political implications inherent
in a longer range system which can strike targets in the
2 8Soviet Union.” As it became more apparent that a theater 
nuclear modernization requiring longer range systems would
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take place, however, those implications were set aside, and 
in 1979 the "extended range" Pershing II system became a 
candidate for the new NATO deployment.
The Military Equation
Other systems were in contention for deployment, includ­
ing several ballistic missiles with considerably longer 
range than the Pershing II, but the focus of debate within 
the Alliance between the February 1978 decision and the 
initial deployment nearly six years later centered on a more 
fundamental issue. Was any modernization of NATO's TNF 
structure necessary ̂ or desirable? Arguments took place 
within two broad categories, military needs and political 
considerations» Arguments over definitions and the accuracy 
of statistical data added to the complexity of the military 
debates.
Proponents of the deployments contended that "the
growth of Soviet military power has been relentless", and
that increasingly Moscow was fielding a global military 
29threat. A simultaneous decrease in Western military 
expenditures, especially in the United States, was creating 
an "increasingly dangerous military imbalance" which combined 
with growing instability throughout the world raised "pro­
found doubts about the prospects of the members of the North
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Atlantic T r e a t y B o t h  NATO and Central Intelligence 
Agency reports indicated that real growth of Soviet military 
spending averaged 4 to 5 percent annually, and it seemed 
clear to those backing the TNF modernization that Moscow 
was expending far more for its military than was required 
for defensive purposes alone; Soviet intentions were offen­
sive in nature.
Strategic parity between the superpowers made the
growing Soviet threat even more ominous, especially in the
European theater where "disparity in the medium-range poten—
3Ttial is gaining greater and greater significance." , With 
its increased accuracy, the SS-20 was viewed by some as 
posing an extreme offensive threat; since the new system 
possessed a counterforce capability against Western Europe 
it endangered all of the Alliance's land-based nuclear 
systems.
Opponents of the LRTNF deployments countered that 
Europe had been living in the shadow of the SS-4 and SS-5 
for twenty years, that estimates of the accuracy of the SS-20 
were exaggerated, and that the older Soviet missiles pre­
sented "a threat not qualitatively different from that posed
32by the SS-20." Some argued that the SS-4 and SS-5 had 
been targeted against major European urban areas not as 
an offensive threat, but in an effort to deter American 
strikes against the Soviet Union, and that the modernized
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system was intended by the Soviets to perform the same 
function» Those opposed to the NATO deployments noted that 
Moscow’s tendency to build a military structure which far 
exceeded its defensive needs was deeply rooted in the 
Russian tradition, and that, far from being novel, had been 
the standard operating procedure for the Tsars. -In 
1979 a Senate report indicated that some NATO officials 
believed that the TNF problem was primarily political and 
psychological. One veteran NATO diplomat contended, "because 
we did not dismiss the SS-20s as useless overkill typical of 
Soviet practice, we are now unable to ignore them."^^
In response to the claim that strategic parity exacer­
bated the problems associated with the theater imbalance,
deployment opponents maintained that for practical purposes,
35strategic parity had existed for many years. Noting the 
long standing tendency of Alliance military planners to 
exaggerate the strength of Soviet armed forces, they 
questioned the accuracy of data which indicated that Moscow 
was outpacing the West in military expenditures. Not only 
was the overall military balance unlikely to tip toward 
the Soviets, but critics of the cruise and Pershing II 
cited evidence that there was nuclear parity within the 
theater. The widely respected yearly report of the inter­
national Institute of Strategic Studies commented that in 1979
it would certainly require some very major dis­placements of the figures to show any substantial
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imbalance in terms o£ overall system utility* It is 
even doubtful in our view whether the adverse ratio 
in terms of the total number of warheads assumed to 
be deliverable is significant at p r e s e n t *36
Proponents of modernization substantiated their claims
with the same IISS report which also noted that if current
trends continued the Soviet bloc would begin to build a lead
37in theater nuclear systems.
The effect of the SS-20 and Backfire threat would be 
increased by further operational deployments of the 
shorter-range SS—21, SS-22, and SS—23, and development of 
Wabsaw Pact nuclear artillery*. Supporters of NATO’s modern­
ization plan noted that against this array of relatively new 
equipment the Atlantic Alliance was fielding hopelessly out­
dated forces- The backbone of the Alliance’s land-based 
theater forces^ the P-111 aircraft, had first been deployed 
in 1967, and advances in Warsaw Pact air defense systems 
made this delivery system, and the even older Vulcan bomber, 
extremely vulnerable in flight* Because these aircraft were 
tied to easily identifiable airbases they were also suscep­
tible to surprise counterforce attacks* As for land-based
38intermediate-range missiles, NATO had none*
The mid-range arsenal appeared little better suited 
for opposing a Soviet attack. The only Alliance missile 
with this range was the Pershing 1-A which had been deployed 
in the 1960s* Although the old Pershing was somewhat mobile, 
it suffered from various drawbacks. Because of its relatively
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inaccurate warheads— a circular error probable* (CEP) of
twelve hundred feet— it would not be very effective
39weapon against hardened targets. This inaccuracy combined
with the large yield of its warheads also meant that the
collateral damage caused by a Pershing 1-A strike would make
the missile*s use impracticable in many of the situations
expected to be encountered during a battle in the European
theater. In effect^ proponents of the highly accurate
cruise and Pershing II maintained, the Pershing I-A was
self-deterring. The same could be said for the short-range
battlefield weapons in the Alliance*s nuclear arsenal. NATO’s
military planners would be reluctant to fire these weapons
because the high-yield warheads on these systems could cause
a great deal of unnecessary damage, quite possibly to areas
40Which they were intended to defend.
Aircraft accounted for over 85 percent of NATO’s mid­
range forces, and except for approximately sixty carrier 
based planes (less than 5 percent of the total) all were 
based at easily located sites. F—104 and F-4 aircraft 
together comprised over three—fourths of NATO’s mid-range 
air force, and had been originally deployed in 1958 and 1962 
respectively. The vast majority of the Alliance’s other 
planes had been brought to Europe in the mid-1960s.
No NATO aircraft, even in the longe range forces, could 
match the striking distance of the SS-20, which the IISS
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estimated at four thousand nautical m i l e s , a n d  although 
the seven thousand warheads held by Allied forces in Europe 
seemed an* impressive number, two-thirds of them were compo­
nents of delivery systems with a range of less than one
42hundred miles. Proponents of TNF modernization contended 
that many of the Warsaw Pact’s mid-range weapons, which 
outnumbered NATO’s by nearly three to one, could not be 
attacked by comparable Allied systems. In sum, excessive 
yxields, low accuracy, lack of proper reach, and increasing 
vulnerability indicated that the theater nuclear balance was 
heavily weighted against the Allies.
Critics of the possible NATO deployment armed them­
selves with statistics which included additional forces in 
the intermediate-range inventory* Their tallies included 
the 128 British and French Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missiles (SLBM), the eighteen French land-based IRBMs, and 
the four hundred warheads contained on the forty-five 
American SLBMs assigned to the Allies (i.e., targeted to 
NATO specifications) in their computations of theater
forces. Thus, they maintained, NATO possessed a formidable
44arsenal of missiles capable of reaching Soviet territory.
In any case, they pointed out, the problem of sanctuary for 
the SS— 20 could not be solved by either the GLCM or Pershing 
II since both had a range of less than half that of the 
Soviet missile. Concern over the vulnerability of aircraft
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assigned to a theater nuclear role was also addressed by 
reference to the highly mobile, relatively invulnerable 
SLBM force.
According to some opponents of the proposed deployments
smaller, more accurate warheads on already existing short-
range and medium-range forces would dispell any self-deterent
difficulties. Others contended that the heavy reliance on
TNFs which would be created by the new systems would, itself,
act as a self-deterrent since the possibility of escalation
would increase substantially if the modernized intermediate-
45range systems were ever actually used.
On a more fundamental level, opponents resurrected the
traditional argument that the Alliance had no clear tactical
nuclear doctrine, and that the new technologies of the cruise
and Pershing II would simply be a superfluous addition to ”a
conglomerate of an arsen^al which has proved to be impractical
46and probably almost suicidal." Many within the Alliance 
believed that from the standpoint of warfighting ability, 
the suggested LRTNF modernizations represented an expensive 
redundancy.
Deterrence and Escalation
Supporters of the new TNF systems were convinced that 
the cruise and Pershing ii would give added strength to the
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long-standing Alliance strategy of ^flexible response.”
By filling in some of the gaps between short and long-
range nuclear systems the improved missiles would add
vitally needed strands to the "seamless web" which had
been envisioned by the Military Committee in 1967. This
would ensure that defensive actions could be taken at levels
appropriate to the scale of the enemy attack. Allied forces
would be fully prepared to respond to any enemy escalation
or be in a better position to initiate escalation if neces- 
47sary.
The chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee noted,
"Moscow must at all times be forced to reckon with the full
48ladder of escalation." By adding rungs to NATO's graduated
escalatory ladder, the Alliance could confront the Soviets
with a full continuum of forces and enhance the credibility
49of the Allies' deterrent threat.
Should deterrence fail, the added threat posed by the 
cruise and Pershing II would aid in preventing the Soviets 
from crossing the nuclear threshold, but should this fire­
break be crossed, the "flexible response" doctrine maintained 
that at each higher level of escgilation NATO should possess 
forces which would allow them to control the situation by 
ensuring that further escalation would not prove advantageous 
to the enemy. Western military planners had long assumed 
that NATO would always be in the position of "escalatory
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control”* in any European conflict^® but there was now some 
concern that the SS-20 would give the Soviets escalation 
dominance* Proponents of the modernization argued that with 
the balance of forces currently available, NATO’s use of
theater weapons would probably leave the Allies in a
5iworse position than the Soviet Union.
Loss of escalation dominance would severely undercut 
the credibility of the Alliance’s warfighting capabilities 
and further weaken the W est’s overall deterrent posture. 
While one of the essential elements of the new deployment 
would be to ensure the coupling of TNFs and the central 
strategic force of the United States, the supposition that 
the new weapons would actually be used in the event of war 
was also critical, because ’’the essence of deterrence is 
that he who wants to deter a conflict must be prepared to 
wage it*”^^
For those attempting to stop implementation of the 
HLG recommendations, the ability to conduct a nuclear con­
flict heightened the probability that one would take place. 
Building up military forces in an attempt to establish 
controls on escalation tended to make escalation more 
likely. Klass de Vries, a Ddtch legislator and one of the 
most outspoken critics of TNF modernization, pointed out
the dangers of NATO’s ’’excessive preoccupation with limited
5 3war scenarios.” To many observers, these scenarios
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seemed detached from the probable realities associated with 
a European war. Theoretically limited nuclear war might 
make sense, but "prospects for these limitations working out 
in actual war appear to be very low, because it would be 
extremely difficult for either side to determine whether 
restraints were being m a i n t a i n e d . M a n y  who opposed the 
cruise and Pershing II were convinced that once the distinct 
non-nuclear to nuclear firebreak was crossed, further esca­
lation became inevitable, and that in real war situations
the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons would 
55disappear.
Installation of the Pershing II would prove particularly 
worrisome.. In case of a crisis the forward-based Pershing, 
which could reach command facilities located on Soviet ter­
ritory in less than six minutes, might induce Russian military 
planners to enact a launch—on-warning policy, increasing 
the possibilities of inadvertent escalation. Should a 
crisis become severe, Soviet fears of the Pershing II might 
take the form of a pre-emptive strike. The likelihood of 
such a response would be increased by Soviet awareness that 
the Pershing II was scheduled to replace the Pershing I-A 
in NATO * s Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) force. Consequently,
a high percentage of the new missiles would be available
S 6for launch on very short notice.
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The increased accuracy and limited yield of the proposed 
weapons would also act to lower the nuclear threshold by 
blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear 
armaments. Opponents of the modernization believed that "by 
lowering the perceived consequences to NATO of nuclear first 
use, and increasing the Soviet’s expectations that their 
nuclear systems will be preemptively attacked," the Alliance 
was substantially lowering the nuclear threshold.
In efforts to prevent the TNF deployments, some 
members of the Atlantic community argued that the new 
missiles would actually serve to decouple U.S. strategic 
weapons from the defense of Europe. Rather than acting as 
a visible sign of support, they might be perceived as a 
substitute for strategic weapons and increase the possibil­
ity of the superpowers waging a nuclear war exclusively on 
European territory. If regional forces were balanced, war 
could be waged on a regional level without recourse to
C  QStrategic weapons.
Many opponents of the LRTNF systems agreed with the 
advocates of the deployments that the Alliance needed to 
maintain a strong deterrent force, but insisted that 
resources expended for deterrence would be better spent 
on conventional forces. They consistently pointed out 
that stronger conventional forces would present NATO com­
manders with a wider variety of effective actions within
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the range of options below the nuclear threshold. Deterring 
conflict by increasing military capabilities was a policy 
of dangerous contradictions, especially on the nuclear level. 
The only nuclear systems which would effectively deter were 
those which might reasonably be used to wage war. The more 
likely they were to be used, the lower the nuclear threshold.
Conventional Levels
Proponents of TNP modernization were quick to point 
out that from its beginnings, NATO had relied on nuclear 
weapons to balance Soviet superiority in conventional forces. 
While plans formulated for implementation of Alliance strategy 
had frequently called for increases in ground troops, active 
ground troops in the European theater had declined some 88,000 
since the implementation of "flexible response" in 1967,
While Soviet forces had increased by 154,000. In 1977,
NATO statistics indicated that Warsaw Pact troops outnumbered 
Allied forces by 925,000 to 777,000.^® The Soviet bloc could 
field 25,000 tanks, NATO only 9,900.®^
Advocates of the cruise and Pershing deployments esti­
mated that in realistic scenarios, the Warsaw Pact would 
be attacking with a two— to-one or three-to-one (some esti­
mated as high as five-to-one) ground troop advantage.
"NATO could not resist a concerted Soviet conventional
6 2offensive for more than several days." Long-range nuclear
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forces could offset this discrepancy without causing any 
collateral damage to Allied resources if used to interdict 
second and third echeloo forces behind enemy lines. The cost
of the entire LRTNF deployment would be a reasonable $4 to
6 3$5 billion for the first ten years of the program- Given 
the current recession. Allied governments were not likely 
to make any substantial increases in conventional force 
levels»
NATO Officials backing the new missile systems also 
noted that the GLCM and Pershing would actually increase 
the Alliance’s conventional forces by making aircraft which 
had been assigned to nuclear attack roles available for use 
in conventional modes.
Deployment opponents questioned the wisdom of such 
a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons and disputed claims that 
NATO could not stage an adequate conventional defense. ”We 
have exaggerated the Warsaw Pact so much for so long,” com­
mented Alain Enthoven, ”that we assume, without even making 
the assumption explicit, that our forces would be overrun 
and defeated.” While it would be difficult for NATO to 
emerge as an outright winner in conventional conflict.
Allied forces could deny the Soviets a quick victory and 
engage Warsaw Pact forces in a war of attrition where the
”West*s resources and technology could be used to best ad-
65vantage.”
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Adversaries of the TNF modernization also contended 
that the reliability of Moscow’s allies should be taken 
into account when comparing force levels, because even 
the "Kremlin strongly suspects— especially after the 
1980—1981 events in Poland— that the East Europeans who 
constitute half of Warsaw Pact forces would turn against 
Moscow in any protracted war."
New technologies might also make effective conventional 
defense less expensive. Fewer troops could achieve the 
same results using a variety of Precision Guided Munitions* 
(PGMs) which were becoming available to the Alliance. Soviet 
strategy, based on the use of high speed armored units unsup­
ported by infantry and artillery, would be especially 
vulnerable to PGM attacks.
As for claims of the high economy of the proposed LRTNFs, 
deployment critics noted that both the GLCM and Pershing II 
were still in development and testing, and that if early 
results were any indication, large additional expenditures 
would be required before the systems became dependable. In 
September 1981, the Department of Defense estimated that 
the cost of the Pershing II system would be $1.8 billion; 
three months later it revised its estimate to $0.8 billion.
NATO commander General Bernard W. Rogers predicted that 
a Soviet attack against conventional Allied forces deployed 
at 1983 levels would have to be countered quickly by nuclear
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
weapons. He commented, "We have mortgaged our defense to 
the nuclear response.”®^ Substantial numbers of those 
supporting the LRTNF modernization cautioned that conven­
tional forces would also have to be strengthened; many who 
were attempting to prevent the new nuclear deployments were 
convinced that whatever amount was appropriated for the GLCM 
and Pershing II would be better spent on conventional forces,
Conclusion
European initiatives during the first year of the 
Carter administration created pressures within the Alliance 
for programs to offset improved Soviet delivery systems.
In the United States,. Congressional leaders over a period 
of many years had been examining America's commitment to 
the North Atlantic Alliance, but in 1974 these appraisals 
began to focus on the posture of theater nuclear forces in 
Europe, This new focus, together with the European initia­
tive increased the demands on the administration to address 
the theater nuclear issue. Within NATO, the nuclear con­
sultative structure was expanded to examine the specific 
issues raised by the new debate.
American influence in the newly formed HLG was exten­
sive. Its chairman was an American, and much of its agenda 
was provided by the U.S. Department of Defense. Less than
five months after its creation, the HLG made its preliminary
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 7
proposal on TNP policy. U.S. weapons systems which had been 
in the development pipeline for nearly a decade would provide 
the hardware with which to implement the decision.
The debates over the military aspects of the proposed 
deployment were complex and lengthy. Nearly two years 
elapsed between the HLG * s first recommendations and accep­
tance of a TNF modernization by the North Atlantic Council.
It is clear that no definitive answees regarding the 
military necessity of the new systems emerged during this 
period, yet the Carter administration would have to make 
a determination on the deployment plan.
For although all fifteen nations in the Alliance provided 
input into the discussion, the final decision on production 
of the new systems rested in Washington. Any European 
country could refuse to deploy the modernized forces, and 
several did, but the program could still be implemented*
If the United States chose to boycott the program, the 
deployments would not take place*
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CHAPTER I I I
THE THEATER NUCLEAR THREAT AND 
POLITICAL COHESION
Prior to the High Level Group’s preliminary determination 
in February.1978^ debates on LRTNF modernization had been 
confined primarily within the Alliance governments, NATO 
itselfy and the various quasi-official Alliance organs. As 
public awareness of the neutron bomb debate increased, the 
entire question of theater nuclear modernization took on 
added political significance. After the April 1978 decision 
to defer production of the enhanced radiation bomb was made, 
public attention shifted to the cruise and Pershing II "Euro— 
m i s s i l e s . I t  was within the context of an increasingly 
heated public debate that the Carter administration examined 
the TNF options.
Pressures for deployment were also building from within 
the American bureaucratic structure. After many years of 
planning and development, both the GLCM and Pershing II were 
systems seeking a mission. Congressional inquiries in 1978 
and 1979 indicated quite clearly that neither missile had 
been designed as part of an overall theater strategy, and 
that Department of Defense TNF proposals were not part of 
any integrated plan, "but instead consisted of a menu-like 
array of program choices without identifying a cohesive 
management plan for structuring our theater nuclear... 
programs."
72
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If the Carter elite had been convinced that the cruise 
and Pershing II deployments were essential to Europe’s 
defense, they could have chosen these two items from the 
"menu," In fact, however, they were convinced of just 
the opposite.
No Millitary Necessity
As the Europeans who favored the modernization pressed 
their case early in 1977, officials in the highest levels 
of the Carted administration voiced their reservations con­
cerning the military necessity of the new missiles. Although 
the President discussed the possibility of revamping the 
U.S. nuclear force in Europe, he proclaimed that these forces 
were "fully adequate." Carter maintained that European de­
fense was a top American priority, but emphasized that 
improved conventional forces would be the focus of U.S. 
defense efforts. With the advent of strategic nuclear par­
ity, he said, "the role of conventional forces in deterrence
2of war is increasingly important."
Both Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who noted that 
"substantial improvement in our conventional defense in
3Europe is long overdue," and National Security Adviser, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who emphasized "enhanced allied cap­
abilities for conventional warfare,"^ agreed with the 
President’s emphasis. Repeating patterns set in past debates.
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the dichotomy between the U.S. focus on conventional deter­
rence and the European reliance on nuclear deterrence was 
becoming apparent.
The American accentuation of conventional strategy was 
increased by some administration officials* concepts of 
tactical nuclear war. During his confirmation hearings, 
Cyrus Vance said that he doubted there could be a limited
5nuclear war using tactical nuclear weapons. Secretary
Vance believed that the Allies should "forgo speculation
about the possibilities of fighting a so-called limited
nuclear war— speculation that only increases the risk
6of conflict.** When asked if any nuclear exchange could 
remain limited. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown responded,
7**I, for one> have very serious doubts that one could.**
When Europeans expressed fears that a protocol, to
SALT II might inhibit deployment of the GLCM, Secretary
Vance had difficulty understanding their concern, "since at
8the time we had no plans to deploy them.** Brzezinski noted 
that there had never been a nuclear balance in Europe and 
that NATO had survived many years of Warsaw Pact superiority
9in Intermediate Nuclear Forces*(INF). Eventually, however. 
Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski all supported the h l G* s plan, 
and all supported it for the same reason. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski commented, **initially, I was doubtful that a 
military response based in Europe was needed, but I was 
convinced by my staff...of the political necessity to deploy
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10a European—based nuclear counter.**
The Neutron Bomb and Leadership
The political need for the cruise and Pershing II 
deployments was greatly magnified by the Allies' inept 
handling of the neutron bomb controversy. Scientists 
at Los Alamos had been lobbying for the production of an 
efficient ERW for.many years, and in 1973 development of a 
new device began. President Gerald Ford had authorized 
construction of the new weapon, and there is some evidence 
tĉ  suggest that neither President Carter nor Defense Secre­
tary Brown was aware that $42 million had been authorized 
for the device in Ford * s last b u d g e t . T h e  bomb would 
effect the same radition kill as a standard fushion weapon 
which had a blast yield ten times that of the ERW.
Xn July 1977, President Carter had tentatively author­
ized. continued development of the ERW, but a series of 
Washington Post articles which had started a month earlier 
sparked a public protest, and the President began to question 
his initial decision*
The lead article in the Post series implied that the 
government was attempting to hide the ERW program from pub­
lic examination by developing the device with Energy Research 
and Development (ERDA) funds. The article's headline set 
the tone for a good part of the article, "Neutron Killer
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Warhead Buried in ERDA B u d g e t . C o n s e q u e n t  media
13portrayals "sensationalized the debate which followed,"
and European press services quickly internationalized the
public discussions. While administration officials viewed
Moscow's contribution to the debate as a purely propaganda
weapon "for obfuscating the issue of their own deployment
of the huge fifteen thousand kiloton SS-20,"^^ the Soviet
press was able to contribute to the glare of publicity which
was growing around the neutron bomb.
"The public uproar made production and deployment of
the weapon a test of the administration's will to carry out
its stated intention to strengthen NATO's d e f e n s e , a n d
advisors urged the President to take a hard line on the ^
issue, to produce the weapon, or at least to use it as a
bargaining chip in negotiations on the 55—20, The President
16was hesitant; he did not wish to be viewed as an "ogre."
More accurately, he did not wish to be viewed as the only 
ogre.
Despite Carter's misgivings, however, Vance, Brzezinski,
and Brown carefully proceeded to lay the groundwork for
eventual deployment. A growing rift between the 5ecretary
of State and the National Security Adviser, and an apparent
lack of clear communications between the President and his
top advisors complicated the decision process. By the end
of 1977 the ERW debate
had become a test of the alliance's ability to make hard and politically sensitive decisions. Worse,
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for many Allies, the issue was becoming a test of 
the President's ability to lead the A l l i a n c e . 1 7
Worse yety American delegations sent to persuade
the Europeans to accept the ERW were presenting the proposal
as if it had been formulated by the President
President's advisers "had underestimated the degree of
ISCarter's reluctance to deploy this new weapon." By March 
1979, the European Allies and, apparently, the government 
of the United States had agreed to announce plans for 
production of the new weapon. Xt would also be announced 
that the production would be abandoned if the Soviets 
would agree not to deploy any more SS-20s. If negotiations 
toward this end did not succeed within two years, the 
neutron bomb would be stationed on the European continent.
Carter was apparently not aware that Allied plans had 
progressed so far. Barely a week before the formal announce­
ment of agreement was to be made, he received a memorandum 
detailing the Alliance proposal. The suprised President 
wrote in his diary.
They had generated a lot of momentum, including 
an immediate agreement for me to produce these 
neutron weapons* My cautionary words to them since 
last summer have pretty well been ignored, and I 
was aggravated.19
A meeting of the administration's top foreign policy advisers
was quickly convened on March 20, 1978.
Carter was angered by the European's refusal to
express their support for the neutron bomb in public. He
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was annbyed by Bonn’s insistence that Germany would never
deploy the ERW unless another continental Ally also agreed
to do so. He insisted that he would not approve production
•’unless the Germans publicly committed themselves to 
20deploy.” Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski were all shocked,
and strongly urged that the President make a positive
decision on ERW production. Vance later noted that the
President "appeared not to appreciate the enormous damage
to his prestige and U.S. leadership that would result" from
21a negative decision. Brzezinski warned the President that
backing out would stamp Carter .^s weak, and advised that
"leadership means making the decisions which the Europeans
22are not prepared to make."
Carter listened to his advisers, but was not moved.
At one point he c o m m e n t e d , w i s h  I had never heard of this
weapon." He would not be forced into bearing the political
23burden alone. He informed his staff to postpone the 
Atlantic Council Meeting scheduled to announce the decision, 
and advised Vance to notify the Allies that production would 
be deferred until the Europeans were prepared to submit a 
firm, public request for the new warheads. At subsequent 
meetings with Vance and Brzezinski, the President held 
firm, and on April 7, 1978, the public was informed that 
the neutron bomb would not, for the time being, be produced.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
The Carter decision to predicate American production of 
a weapons system on a prior European commitment for its 
deployment was unprecedented in the history of Alliance 
nuclear policy formulation. It did, however, set the pattern 
for later discussions on the GLCM and Pershing II. From the 
Présidentes viewpoint, "although some confusion was gener­
ated within the NATO Alliance," the deferment decision was
24the proper one. Other administration officials contended
that it represented a major setback in u.S.-European rela- 
25tions* Secretary Vance commented that the ghost of the 
ERW decision would "haunt subsequent Alliance consultations 
on the far more significant issue...of NATO's long-range 
theater nuclear capabilities." F%r some proponents of INF 
modernization it would be a very useful ghost.
The Credibility of America's Commitment
Following the neutron bomb debacle the poCtitical aspects
of the TNF modernization assumed far greater significance.
The deployment now represented in both concrete and symbolic
terms "the community of fate that links the United States
26to Western Europe." That link had been severely strained, 
and agreement on the new weapons was needed to prove that 
the Alliance could "still summon the essential cohesion, 
relevance, and resolve to deal with fundamental security 
2 7questions."
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Atlantic cohesion was further tested as relations
between Chancellor Schmidt and high level American officials,
including the President, were strained. Zbigniew Brzezinski
noted that Schmidt’s "invidious gossip and derogatory asides..
contributed greatly to the deterioration in American—German 
28relations.” President Carter believed that the Chancellor’s
persistent public criticism of the United States "helped to
29legitimize anti-American sentiment in Germany."
In Bonn, Schmidt was confronted with a delicate political 
equation. The natural tendency of the left-wing of his 
Social Democratic Party was to oppose the stationing of more 
American missiles on European territory, while the minority 
party of the ruling coalition, the Free Democrats, believed 
that the deployment was essential to counter the SS—20.
Schmidt apparently chose to deal with this difficult situation 
by generally supporting the deployment while expressing 
public criticism of President Carter and U.S. policies.
Schmidt was also prone to equivocation on the TNF issue, and 
could at times, be perceived as opposing the modernizations.
At one crucial juncture, he launched a trial balloon suggest­
ing that a moratorium on the deployment of all theater 
devices be enacted. President Carter quickly rebuffed the 
Chancellor, adding fuel to the leaders’ feud.
On September 1, 1979 former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger delivered an address which simultaneously provided
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advocates of TNF modernization with powerful ammunition,
and delivered another shock to Allied confidence* As a
private citizen, Kissinger maintained, he could say what he
had not been allowed to say as Secretary of State* The U.S.
strategic deterrent was a mirage. "We must face the fact,"
he said,, "that it is absurd in the 1980s to base the strategy
of the West on the credibility of the thr&at of mutual 
31suicide." He further observed that
our European allies should not keep asking us 
to multiply strategic assurances that we 
cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we should 
not want to execute, because if we execute, we 
risk the destruction of civilization.^^
According to Kissinger, the military viability of NATO was 
in jeopardy, and one essential part of a policy to save the 
Alliance was the deployment of the new theater nuclear forces, 
Kissinger’s address, which opened a symposium on the 
future of the North Atlantic Alliance, contributed to 
lively conference debates. Problems relating to the mil­
itary balance were examined, but much of the discussion 
centered on the political aspects of the proposed deployment. 
Some conferfee<s portrayed the theater nuclear modernization
"as a ’panicky' response to developments such as the
33neutron bomb fiasco and SALT II protocol." Some attend­
ing the conference maintained that Soviet internal problems 
would constrain Moscow’s international behavior, but others, 
including NATO Secretary General, Joseph Luns, expressed 
concern that if the threat posed by the SS-20 were not met
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promptly, Europe would be open to political blackmail
The highly publicized remarks by Kissinger elicited
quick responses from top level American officials* Within
a month both Brzezinski and Vance had delivered public
statements comfirming America*s unequivocal "commitment to
defend Europe with all the means necessary— nuclear and
conventional,” and pointing out that "the substantial forces
we have deployed to Europe are one concrete evidence of that 
35commitment."
Similar sentiments were expressed in a September 1977 
speech by McGeorge Bundy, a leading opponent of TNF modern­
ization. He noted that the 300,000 U.S. troops stationed in 
Europe, not nuclear weapons, were the firmest proof of 
Americans commitment. As for strategic assurances, Bundy 
asserted that the American guarantee did not rest on the 
number of warheads available to NATO, but rather on the
ability of the Alliance to present a "wholly unacceptable
36and innately unpredictable risk to the other side." The
Alliance*s strategic protection would be "as strong or as
weak as the American strategic guarantee no matter what
weapons are deployed under NATO." Bundy also observed that
any American missile which could reach the Soviet Union
would undoubtedly be regarded by Moscow as a strategic
weapon. American leaders, too, would have to regard them
37as strategic.
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This last point was important in arguments presented by 
a number of deployment critics who contended that the GLCM 
and Pershing II were actually strategic missiles. The LRTNFs, 
therefore, would have no utility in filling the gaps in 
NATO*s continuum* Some American observers were especially 
concerned that strategic weapons stationed so close to the 
possible, area of battle could not be monitored and control­
led as effectively as other strategic systems, and that in 
the heat of battle a local commander about to be overrun
might launch the missiles under his command rather than have
38them captured by enemy forces* Some Europeans worried 
that the United States might be too ready to use its nuclear 
forces, but for the most part, the core of European govern­
ment concerns lay in speculation that the American’s would 
be unwilling to use their nuclear weapons at all * The basic 
issue on which the deployment decision would hinge was 
European confidence in America’s leadership and commitment.
Detente and Confidence
In general, the policies of Jimmy Carter did not instill
confidence in the NATO allies* The President's sense of
mission in the area of human rights may have been successful
in introducing a strong moral content into American foreign
39policy, but it ’♦made many European leaders nervous.”
Carter left little room for compromise on this issue. "Our
commitment to human rights must be absolute," he said in
40s, and during his first major speech
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on foreign affairs he noted, "we can no longer separate the 
traditional issues of war and peace from the new global 
questions of equity and human rights.
The Carter initiative was welcomed in many parts of 
the world, but Western European leaders viewed it as "hope­
lessly naive" and a real danger to the process of detente.
The continental Allies generally viewed cordial relations 
with the Soviet Union as an important goal and had no inten­
tions of sacrificing the improvements in East-West relations 
made during the Nixon years for the nebulous benefits of 
improvements in human rights.
Moscow’s response to Carter’s criticisms of supressive
activities in Eastern Europe and Russia was swift and
intensely negative. In a February 1977 letter from Party
Chairman Brezhnev to Carter, the Russian leader insisted
that his country would not "allow interference in our
internal affairs, whatever pseudohumanitarian slogans are
used to present i t T o  illustrate this point, the Soviets
quickly intensified the suppression of dissident elements
in Russia. The human rights issue had an immediate effect
on other Soviet-*American relations. Secretary of State Vance
had hoped to begin his first discussion with Chairman Brezhnev
by outlining America’s SALT position, instead, "Brezhnev
immediately launched into a diatribe in which he catalogued
44alleged human rights violations in the United States."'
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
Other elements of U.S. foreign policy contributed to 
the withering of detente. The December 1978 announcement 
that relations between the United States and People's Repub­
lic of China had been normalized was not received well in 
Moscow. Nor could public discussion of Presidential 
Directive 59 (PD-59) have given the Soviets any comfort.
Studies for PD— 59 had been initiated in the summer of 
1977, and the final document was apparently little more 
than a refinement of Nixon's "strategic sufficiency" doctrine. 
But press reports portrayed the new Carter strategy as the 
implementation of a counterforce, and therefore, a first 
strike capability► Secretary Brown denied that the "counter­
vailing" strategy contained in PD-59 substituted '^military 
targets for civilian ones. The new targeting doctrine, he 
explained, was designed to "increase the number add variety 
of options available to the President in the event of 
Soviet attack at any l e v e l . T h e  "countervailing strat­
egy" would assure that any limited strategic strike by the 
Soviet could be matched in a "selective an A  measured way" 
while retaining enough weapons in reserve to still assure 
massive destruction of Russian civilian, industrial, and 
military targets. The deterrent aspects of PD-59 were 
emphasized by the administration, but increasing the number 
and variety of Soviet facilities targeted by American nuclear 
systems was unlikely to bolster sagging superpower relations.
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The effect of PD-59 on detente was bound to have nega­
tive repercussions on European confidence in U.S. foreign 
policy, but another presidential document, parts of which 
were leaked to the press in August 1977, affected Allied 
relations more directly. Press reports indicated that 
Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-10) considered the 
possibility of abandoning the Alliance’s forward defense 
doctrine and of using mobile defense strategies which would 
abandon the eastern third of Germany in order to defend the 
rest of it. The implications of this possible strategy 
linked to the use of tactical nuclear weapons were immedi­
ately apparent to the inhabitants of Hamburg and Munich. 
Reportedly, PRM-10 also dictated that American officials
publicly remain committed to forward defense while secretly
47preparing to implement the mobile defense plan. The
President quickly addressed a letter to the Atlantic Treaty
Association in which he confirmed that "the United States
remains categorically commited to NATO's strategy of forward 
4Sdefense." From the standpoint of Allied relations, however, 
much damage had already been done.
Increasing pressures outside the treaty area were also 
creating tensions within the alliance. Of particular 
concern was the secure supply of strategic materials such 
as titanium and cobalt. The securing of reliable supplies 
of oil had also taken on added significance since 1973.
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U.S. military forces were the primary, and in some regions
the only, guardians of the West's supply lines, and as the
Soviets' global reach expanded, European doubt that the
United States would effectively counter Soviet actions grew.
On the other hand, U.S. officials had often complained that
the Allies made far too small a contribution toward assuring
49global security.
Partly as a response to Allied concern, but motivated 
primarily by events in Iran and Afghanistan, the President 
declared in his State of the Union address on January 23,
1980,
Let our position be absolutely clear: any attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States of America and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means neces­
sary, including military f o r c e . 50
Some Allies may have been reassured by the announcement of 
a U.S. commitment to defend the main source of European oil, 
but the "Carter Doctrine" must have reminded others of past 
American proclamations. "Massive retaliation" had extended 
the U.S. commitment to Korea and China; the "Nixon Doctrine" 
had reasserted the U.S. nuclear commitment to Asia. Now 
Carter would protect the Gulf region by "any means necessary.' 
Each further commitment tended to dilute the overall credi­
bility of the American posture and add to some Allies* doubts 
To some extent, every dispute, each action which 
increased Allied tension, intensified the level of debate
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on the TNP modernization. Christopher Bertram, Director of 
the IISS, has pointed out that ’’whenever political relations 
are strained, this finds its expression in nuclear issues.” 
During periods when European trust in American leadership 
wanes, the focus of disputes tends to be n u c l e a r . I t  was 
during such a period that the Allies’ decision to deploy 
the GLCM and Pershing II took place.
The Alliance Decision to Deploy
In October 1978, the HLG received a list of weapons 
options prepared by American planners. Besides the GLCM 
and extended range Pershing, it included the options of 
increasing the number of SLBMs assigned to the Alliance, 
or deploying the ’’Longbow,” an IRBM in the early develop­
mental stages. The ’’Longbow" was rejected because it 
would not be ready for production in time to offset 
the SS—20 threat. The HLG rejected the submarine—based 
system because it believed the deployment should possess
a high degree of public visibility in order to enhance the
52credibility of response and increase its deterrent value.
After six months of deliberation the HLG presented its 
final recommendation to the NPG. The HLG recommended that 
at least two hundred missiles be deployed in order to 
counter the SS-20 deployment, but that no more than six
hundred be deployed so that U.S. strategic forces would
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remain coupled to Europe’s defense. The HLG noted that the 
deployment should take place in as many nations as possible, 
and that the final decision on the modernization plan be made 
by the end of 1979 in order to avoid complications in German 
and American elections scheduled for 1980.^^ The HLG 
proposal noted that the GLCM and Pershing II would be visible, 
survivable, long-range systems which would enhance the 
Alliances ’’flexible response” posture.
In the United States, defense planners were in the
process of determining how many missiles should be sent to
Europe. The number finally agreed upon was 572, set near
the upper limit of the HLG recommendation to allow for
possible reductions requested by the Allies and to enhance
the U.S. bargaining position in negotiations with the 
5 4Soviets. On October 4, 1979 the HLG officially accepted 
the American force level recommendation, sparking an 
intense Russian reaction.
Two days after the HLG announcement, Brezhnev delivered 
a major address in which he accused the United States of 
attempting to upset the existing balance of power in Europe, 
He contended that implementation of the HLG designs "would 
change essentially the strategic situation on the continent." 
Brezhnev warned that if the deployments took place, Moscow 
would have no choice but to station more Russian missiles 
in Eastern Europe, cut he also offered to reduce the number
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of Soviet INFs if NATO would forgo its TNF modernization.
In addition, he announced the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 
Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks from the German Democratic 
Republic.
The American response was consistent with the tenor of
U.S.-Russian relations. Zbigniew Brzezinski believed that
the Soviet proposal was "clearly a propaganda move" which
did not address the specific question of SS-20 deployments.^^
At a press conference three days following the Brezhnev speech.
President Carter noted, "I think it’s an effort designed to
disarm the willingness or eagerness of our allies to
adequately defend themselves," and that efforts should be
made to "modernize the Western Allies' military strength
5 7and then negotiate."
Both the President and Brzezinski had come to accept 
the deployment in large part because they believed that it 
would improve their negotiation posture at arms control talks 
with the Soviets. Many Allies agreed. The Special Group (SG), 
set up in April 1979 at the insistence of Germany and the 
Netherlands, was assigned the task of assessing the impact 
of TNF modernization on arms control negotiations. The SG 
concluded that no arms control agreements would be possible 
without the new deployments. They cited the history of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile negotiations as evidence.^®
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Other Allies insisted that the most likely outcome of
the new LRTNFs would be counter-deployments by the Soviets,
and that the "concept of developing systems as bargaining
59chips does not have a very convincing record." Six
months after the final deployment decision was made, the
Soviets did agree to negotiate on the INF question.
The possible impact which the deployment would have
on arms control was examined in many forums. The U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) noted that the GLCM
would cause verification problems, and that the cruises'
long flight path and ability to change direction might
confuse enemy officials and provoke a response based on exag-
6 0gerated estimates of the NATO attack. A report to the 
North Atlantic Assembly cautioned that European nations 
might build their own cruise missiles if the American systems 
were not deployed.
In an attempt to elicit support from the Dutch and 
Belgian governments, who were particularly troubled about 
the arms control implications of the deployment, the United 
States offered to remove one thousand nuclear warheads from 
Europe. The warheads were obsolete, and not configured to 
be used on delivery systems currently in NATO's inventory. 
More important than this gesture, however, was a proposal 
to link the modernization with increased efforts to negotiate 
controls on theater weapons. Some allies, suspicious of 
America's sincerity, termed the offer the "arms control
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figleaf,” but after extensive consultations, the reluctant
governments were convinced that the American offer was
genuine. With the acceptance of the "two-track" proposal—
deployment combined with negotiations— Alliance consensus
had been achieved.
The final decision was formalized at the December 12,
1979 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The Alliance
would deploy 572 weapons in West Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, and, tentatively, in Belgium and the Netherlands.
The Belgians and Dutch would delay a final decision on
their deployments until they could observe what progress
might be made in the proposed arms talks. The first missiles
were scheduled to become operational by the end of 1983.
A unique element of the December 1979 decision was the
provisions for command and control of the new systems.
Negotiations on previous deployments had been complicated
«by European demands for added authority in the operational 
decisions associated with the new systems. No such demands 
were made for the LRTNFs. During HLG discussions, the 
German government had made it clear that they did not want 
the usual dual-key* system for the new missiles. The Ger­
mans apparently believed that Bonn's control, even the
partial control in dual-key systems, would make closer
6 2relations with the East more difficult. England and 
Italy preferred American control for economic reasons.
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Missiles entirely under U.S. command would have to be 
purchased, deployed,, and maintained with U.S. funds. The 
GLCM and Pershing II would be stationed on American bases 
and operated by American crews. There would be no European 
finger on the long-range TNF trigger.
Conclusion
Sandwiched between the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO's 
December 1979 decision to deploy 572 new missiles in Europe 
had little immediate impact on American public opinion, yet 
for the administration of Jimmy Carter, the decision marked 
one of the few high points in its relations with North Atlan­
tic Treaty members. The decline of detente, the recriminations 
from the neutron bomb fiasco, and the personal animosity 
between the President and Chancellor Schmidt had all contrib­
uted to a loss of American prestige within the Alliance.
To many, America's role as Alliance leader, already shaken 
by Vietnam and Watergate, had been weakened even more.
The European INF initiative was buttressed by large 
amounts of statistical evidence and testimony from respected 
military and political authorities from both sides of the 
Atlantic, yet President Carter and most of his top advisers 
were not convinced of the military need for the new long- 
range theater nuclear weapons. For practical purposes.
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however, military arguments became unimportant. The prestige 
of the President, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear com­
mitment, and the cohesion of the Alliance were at stake.
If Carter could not guide the Alliance toward a 
positive response to so apparent a threat as the deploy­
ment. of the SS-20, many feared that America's influence 
within NATO would be greatly diminished. Posing a credible 
deterrent was, as always, a delicate task. During his term 
as British Defense Minister, Dennis Healy often noted that 
while a 1 percent chance of U.S. nuclear retaliation might 
be enough to deter the Soviets, a 99 percent chance might
fs ̂not be sufficient to reassure the allies.
The GLCM and Pershing II had become symbols of reassur­
ance, and for this reason the Carter administration chose to 
support their deployment. But for those opposed to the 
new systems, the December 1979 decision made by the North 
Atlantic Council was not final. The first missiles would 
not arrive in Europe until late in 1983; there was still one 
more round to be fought.
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CHAPTER I V
THE FINAL ROUND -- A BOISTEROUS ANTI-CLIMAX
Those opponents of the theater nuclear modernization 
who believed that there was still some chance of stopping 
the deployments faced a formidable challenge. If the rela­
tively moderate .Carter administration had supported the 
TNP deployments, what chance was there that an administra­
tion which was proposing massive increases in the U.S. de­
fense budget could be convinced that the modernization was 
ill-advised? If detente under Carter, and especially after 
the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, had suffered, how was 
it likely to fare during an administration which publicly 
viewed the Soviet Union as an "evil empire?"
While the Carter White House emphasized the political 
advantages of the proposed deployment, the Reagan adminis­
tration tended to regard production of the new systems in 
military terms. While Carter officials had recommended the 
deployment of 572 missiles with the expectation that fewer 
than that number would actually be deployed. President Ronald 
Reagan appointed as Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, a 
former Supreme Allied Commander who had complained that 
the number of missiles proposed was inadequate and rep­
resented "only political expediency and tokenism."^
Despite the difficulties facing adversaries of the 
deployments, the numbers of "Euromissile" opponents willing
99
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to take a public stand on the issue grew, and as the date 
for deployment neared the intensity of the protests increased, 
In the United States, the Reagan administration tended to 
characterijse the protesters as well-meaning dupes of Soviet 
propaganda. In Europe the political survival of several 
regimes might rest on the "Euromissile" issue, and public 
dissent could not be dismissed so easily. If one, major 
European government could be forced to change its position, 
the modernization effort would be in danger of collapse.
Leadership and Defense
Ronald Reagan*s style exuded confidence, and the new 
administration soon made it clear that the President intended 
to lead the Alliance forcefully. A top aide to Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger noted that one of America’s big­
gest mistakes in recent years had been its willingness to 
conduct multilateral conferences on weapons development with 
the Allies. A visiting delegation from NATO’s Special 
Group was informed by administration officials that Jimmy 
Carter "had gone too far in abdicating American leadership 
in Alliance nuclear policy," and that nuclear procurement
3would now be decided on a unilateral basis.
During his first year in office. President Reagan 
approved production of the neutron bomb without consultations
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with the Allies. The old process of decision making had 
quickly been reestablished. Several analysts have pointed 
out that European governments probably welcomed the return 
of the system in which they might avoid the "agony" of 
direct involvement in nuclear decisions.^ The exact manner 
in which Reagan*s neutron bomb decision was presented, how­
ever, may have given some Europeans pause.
Following Secretary Weinberger’s announcement that 
the United States would produce the BRW, the Pentagon 
released a statement which speculated that hundreds of the 
weapons might have to be used in Europe in the event of war.  ̂
Xn general, Reagan and his top defense advisers displayed 
few qualms in discussing the possibilities of engaging in a 
limited nuclear conflict in Europe. Clearly, the new admin­
istration held a basically different view on the possibilities 
of fighting a limited war than did Carter and his advisers. 
Speaking to the press in October 1981, Reagan said, "I 
could see where you could have the exchange of tactical 
weapons against troops in the field without it bringing 
either one of the major powers to pushing the button."®
Reagan’s defense analysts believed that a protracted 
nuclear war was a distinct possibility. Scenarios envisioned 
six months of nuclear exchanges between the superpowers, and 
the Pentagon was directed to devise plans to win such pro-
7tracted nuclear conflicts. One element of those plans was
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"horizontal escalation,” a strategy which, according to 
Department of Defense officials, was desigjied to increase 
the flexibility of U.S. response to Soviet aggression. 
Secretary Weinberger explained the rationale behind "hori­
zontal escalation;”
We might choose not to restrict ourselves to 
meeting aggression on its own immediated front.
We might decide to stretch our capabilities to 
engage the enemy in many places, or to concen­
trate our forces and military assets in a few 
of the most critical areas.
The new strategy would rely heavily on a large increase in
OAmerica's arsenal of sea— launched missiles. The new 
President had been given new options.
The additional missiles required to implement "hori­
zontal escalation" were only a small part of the hardware 
which Reagan intended to add to the U.S. arsenal in order to 
help the defense establishment "recover from a decade of
Qneglect,." and his defense plans called for deployment of 
the MX, America's newest ICBM, the revitalization of the 
B-1 bomber program, and the addition of 37,000 warheads 
to the American nuclear stockpile* Funding for these 
programs would be provided by a somewhat reluctant, but 
generally obliging Congress. In November 1983, a month 
before the first GLCMs and Pershing II became operational. 
Congress passed a record $249.8 billion defense bill.^^
U.S. defense expenditures in the year of the North 
Atlantic Council's decision to deploy, 1979, were $122.3
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
billion.+
Noting that the Soviet Union already had "their people 
on a starvation diet as far as consumer products are con­
cerned," President Reagan challenged Moscow. "Do they want 
to meet us realistically on a program of disarmament, or do 
they want to face a legitimate arms race in which w e ’re
racing?" If the Soviets chose the latter course the
President was confident that "we could go forward with an 
arms race and they c a n ’t keep up."
Reagan’s defense policies had a profound influence on 
the second track of the December 1979 decision. His abandon-* 
ment of SALT XI ratification left many Europeans uneasy. To 
some observers it appeared as if the Reagan administration
was attempting to delay arms negotiations until'the massive
12U.S. nuclear buildup was well underway, and administration
rhetoric did not bode well for Soviet-American cooperation.
According to the President, the Soviets were "the focus
13of evil in the modern world." As for arms control, Reagan
told the United Nations General Assembly, "Soviet aggression
and support for violence around the world have eroded the
14confidence needed for arms negotiations."
During Senate hearings on his confirmations as Secretary 
of Defense, Caspar Weinberger testified that the Soviet
+ Both figures in current dollars.
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Union had opened a serious military gap between itself and 
the United States. According to Weinberger, the U.S. would 
have to start closing that gap before Moscow would be will­
ing to take part in serious arms control negotiations.^^ 
Negotiation through strength became the watchword of admin­
istration arms control policy. Reagan told the press that 
the American military buildup would lead to "more realistic 
negotiations because of what we can threaten them with
Carter’s emphasis on the political necessity of the TNF 
deployment was replaced by the belief that the new weapons 
would provide "a vital link" between short-range nuclear ̂ 
forces on the continent and the intercontinental missiles 
in the United S t a t e s . T h e  precise role of the GLCM and 
Pershing II still appeared to be poorly defined, but some 
aspects of the new weapons seemed to be more clearly under­
stood. President Reagan noted, "now what I call strategic,
these theater weapons, they are in the theater of war, of
1.8potential war, but would be used strategically."
Critics of the approaching deployment had noted that 
the Soviet Union would almost certainly perceive no dif­
ference between a nuclear attack launched with tactical
missiles that hit Soviet territory and one launched with
IQstrategic missiles. In a sense. Alliance planners 
acknowledged the strategic aspects of the cruise and 
Pershing II when they officially struck the "TNF" designation
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from their lexicon» Theater nuclear forces would now be
known as intermediate nuclear forces (INF), and long-range
TNFs would be referred to as longer-range intermediate
nuclear forces (LRINF). American officials noted that the
change was made to reflect the scope of Soviet—American talks
on INF issues, and to ’’dispell the idea that the U.S. viewed
Europe as a ’theater* of nuclear conflict distinct from the
20United States." The coupling of American and European 
defenses was again reaffirmed.
A growing number of Europeans, however, were questioning 
the advisability of linking their defense to that of the 
United States. Strident anti-communist statements by the 
President, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s hardline 
stand on Central America helped swell the ranks of groups
opposed to the deployments. The U.S. invasion of Grenada
21would also enhance Reagan’s "trigger happy" image. In
defense of the President, one analyst remarked that Reagan’s
misfortune was that his "plain-spoken...folksiness" was lost
on the Europeans and came across instead "as cold-blooded
22warmongering." A Senate report issued in 1982 noted that 
the Reagan administration "was not adequately sensitive" to 
European opinion, and that "its confrontational rhetoric 
aimed at the Soviet Union...added to grassroots anxiety in 
E u r o p e . A s  the date for deployment neared, public
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demonstrations of that anxiety would grow.
The Alliance Holds the Line
The Reagan administration's anti—Soviet posturing
undoubtedly increased the intensity of the European protests,
but in the fall of 1980, even before Reagan had taken office,
more than 250,000 protesters were marching in the streets 
24of Bonn. A number of factors contributed to the strength
of the "Euromissile” movement. The unique process of
decision in which European governments were asked to confirm
their support for production as well as deployment of new
systems increased pressures on those governments and led
25to wider and more extensive debates. The cancellation of 
the neutron bomb was viewed as a victory by peace groups 
on both sides of the Atlantic and served to encourage 
further protests. The HLG decision to make the new deploy­
ments highly visible tended to increase public awareness of 
the issues involved, and a Soviet media blitz also helped 
to keep European attention focused on the TNF debate.
Many protesters doubted the sincerity of the Allies' 
commitment to the arms control component of the dual-track 
decision, and European peace activists were frustrated
because their governments had no direct input into the
2 6bilateral INF negotiations. An article published in 
the spring of 1982 by four highly respected Americans, all
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with many years of experience in government, maintained that 
the base cause of the dissent lay in the "enormously exces­
sive nuclear weapons systems both in the Soviet Union and
in the Atlantic Alliance.
According to the article, the profusion of nuclear 
weapons had made it practically impossible to formulate 
rational plans for the first use of the nuclear arsenal by 
either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The authors believed that
no one has ever succeeded in articulating any
persuasive reason to believe that any use of
nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale,
could reliably be expected to remain limited.
Only one clearly defined firebreak existed, the one between
28nuclear and non-nuclear war. The authors called for an
enhancement of Allied conventional capabilities. While
admitting that some nuclear weapons would be needed as a
deterrent force, they recommended the scaling down of NATO's
nuclear systems and an acceptance of a "no first use" policy.
The Alliance should publicly declare that it would not be
29the first to cross the nuclear threshold.
A counter-article, written by German officials, noted 
that the Atlantic Alliance had already renounced the first 
use of all types of weapons; NATO was a defensive alliance. 
The article maintained that renouncing first use of nuclear 
weapons would cripple the Alliance's deterrent, increasing 
the likelihood of war in Europe, while agreeing with the
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Americans that raising the nuclear threshold by increasing
conventional options was "urgently necessary,” the German
authors noted that "peace in Europe is inconceivable with-
put the war-preventing effect of nuclear w e a p o n s S h o u l d
nuclear war break out, the article concluded, its effects
would be limited by the realization on both sides that
incautious use of nuclear devices would likely lead to
32uncontrolled escalation*
The no first use debate provided theoretical ammunition 
for both sides of the TNP modernization debate, but 
ultimately it would not be theory, nor military consider­
ations^ nor concerns over Alliance cohesion which would 
determine if the missiles were to be deployed. The final 
round of the debate would be decided within the context of 
domestic politics within the five democracies scheduled 
to recèive the missiles.
Delegates from the British Labor Party addressing 
150,000 "Euromissile" demonstrators in Hyde Park dedLared
that England would not tolerate "annihilation without repre- 
33sentation." In October 1980, the Labor Party adopted a 
resolution calling for the closure of all U.S. and British 
nuclear Installations. While opponents of the TNF moderni­
zation might take encouragement from the Labor resolution, 
the fact remained that the Conservative government of 
Margaret Thatcher, with a comfortable parliamentary
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majority, would make Britain’s TNF decision. Prime Minister
Thatcher’s often stated position on the proposed deployments
might well have been written by NATO publicists. The cruise
missiles scheduled to be stationed near London, according to
Thatcher, were a direct response to the Soviet SS-20. The
responsibility for the Alliance’s need to modernize rested
squarely on Moscow’s shoulders, and demonstrators should
direct their protests accordingly. England was certain to
continue its support for the new missiles.
The political situation in Italy, while chronically in
a state of flux, also appeared favorable for the deployment.
Although Italy’s ”Euromissile” movement was broadly based,
consecutive Italian governments had supported the deployments,
As demonstrations peaked in the final months before the
deployment, all five parties in the ruling coalition
34officially distanced themselves from the protests. Even
the Italian Communist Party was forced into taking a neutral
stand when the Socialist Party, its main left-wing rival,
made support of the new missiles a test of loyalty to the 
35Alliance. Commenting on the size of the Italian demonstra­
tions, Bettino Craxi, Prime minister at the time the first 
missiles were arriving in Europe, commented, ”no opposition 
demonstration.,.could bring about a change in the line of 
conduct of the government fixed by mandate freely decided 
upon by Parliament
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In Bonny the "Euromissile” marchers may have actually
bolstered government support for the new TNF systems.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl insisted.
We*re going to see this through. In this country 
decisions are not made in the street....We*re not 
going to shrink back when faced with force or 
violence. This is 1983, not 1932.37
Kohl, who headed a coalition government more firmly com­
mitted to TNF modernization than Schmidt * s Social Democrats, 
had solidified his political position in March 1983 elections 
Polls indicated at that time that the major concern of the
German voter was economic stability, and that the "Euromis-
38sile" deployment was ”a relatively minor issue." Hans 
Dietrich Gensher, who had served as Foreign Minister under 
Schmidt and who supported the TNF modernization, used the 
7 percent showing of his Free Democrats to retain his post 
under Kohl. Continuity of support in this major government 
position helped ensure final acceptance of the deployment 
in the German legislature.
Within the German government, it was generally accepted 
that despite the vocal, and sometimes violent opposition 
to the cruise and Pershing II, a "silent majority” favored 
the deployments.^^ Although the Social Democrats, whom 
Schmidt had led to initial acceptance of the modernization 
plans, overwhelmingly rejected the deployment at its Novem­
ber 1983 party convention, their political power had been 
substantially diminished by the March elections. The
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"Greens,” legislative candidates who opposed the "Euromis*- 
siles," had made a respectable showing in the elections, 
but their influence in the Bundestag * s final decision would 
be far too little and too late. Germany would accept the 
missiles.
Acceptance of the cruise systems in Belgium and the 
Netherlands was far less certain. In both countries, a 
positive decision on the TNF deployment might well have 
brought about the collapse of the government. This was 
especially true in the Netherlands where a strong pacifist 
strain in the population, a well organized anti-nuclear 
movement, and a badly split coalition government with a 
majority of only four seats, combined to make the political
40atmosphere surrounding the TNF decision particularly tense. 
The governments in both countries decided to deal with their 
precarious situations by deferring their deployment decisions 
as long as possible. In effect, the postponements eliminated 
the Belgian and Dutch components in the overall debate on 
the initial deployments. Even if approved, missile deliver­
ies to the Low Countries would not begin until 1986; in 
England the first cruise launchers would arrive in November 
1983.
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The United States and the Soviet Union: 
Propaganda and Proposals
On November 18, 1981 President Reagan publicly 
proposed that the total number of LRINFs in Europe be set 
at zero. If the Soviet Union would agree to remove the 
approximately 175 SS—20 launchers stationed in Europe, the 
United States would cancel the deployment of its cruise 
and Pershing ll m i s s i l e s . N o t  surprisingly, the Soviets 
objected to this "zero option" plan in which they would be 
required to remove their newest missile system in return 
for a promise from the President. Was the President’s 
offer sincere? Many members of the anti-missile movement 
doubted it.
Four months later. Chairman Brezhnev proposed a unilat­
eral moratorium on the positioning of Soviet missiles west 
of the U r a l s . P r e s i d e n t  Reagan dismissed the proposal, 
in large part because SS-20s stationed east of the Urals 
would still be able to reach the major capitals on the 
European continent. Were the Soviets serious? American 
officials doubted it.
Both the Reagan and Brezhnev proposals fit a pattern 
which had been established during the Carter administration, 
Before the Carter presidency, arms control negotiations 
between the superpowers had been carried out in an atmo­
sphere of "confidentiality...This had helped insulate the
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talks from excessive political or ideological posturing.” 
Carter opened the talks to close public s c r u t i n y . B r e z h n e v  
and Reagan were able to refine the act of posturing to an 
art. Public proposals were met with counter—proposals ; 
accusations led to counter—accusations. Was the President’s 
July 1982 offer to raise the ”zero option” to a ceiling of 
fifty SS-20s designed as a serious negotiating stance or 
a ploy to make the President’s two track policy more credible 
in the eyes of skeptical West Europeans? The muddy waters 
of public arms control negotiations made it impossible to 
distinguish between propaganda and proposal.
In a rather bizarre public relations stunt the Soviets 
attempted to convince the West German press that the United 
States had introduced a new INP proposal which would limit 
the total number of SS—20s in both Europe and Asia to 120, 
and allow the British and French to retain their national 
nuclear f o r c e s . T h e  Soviets were apparently attempting 
to discredit President Reagan by forcing him to reject a 
proposal which the Russians maintained had been presented 
by the American negotiating team. Putting such Byzantine 
endeavors aside, however, the Russians did present a 
series of threats and promises which, if taken seriously, 
should have caused the Alliance grave concern.
The most persistent Soviet threat was that of counter­
deployment. Ranking Soviet officials, including the senior
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
member of the Soviet General Staff and the Warsaw Pact’s 
Soviet commander, warned that unless Allied deployment 
plans were abandoned, new Russian missiles, capable of 
reaching West European targets in four to five minutes, 
would be stationed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia*^^
A Moscow press report observed, "the almost 600 new INATOI 
missiles which are to be installed are not so much new 
shields as..*new t a r g e t s . O n e  Soviet official observed 
that the proposed NATO deployments would violate the Cuban 
missile a g r e e m e n t , t h u s  opening the possibility of a 
counter-deployment in Cuba.
During a speech delivered in May 1981, Chairman Brezhnev 
noted, ”̂ in the seventies, Europe felt the taste of detente,” 
but that detente was in danger, ”primarily because of NATO’s 
decision to deploy new American medium-range missiles in 
Western Europe.” In maintaining that the TNF modernization 
would erode detente, the Soviets emphasized that the new 
missiles would have special effects on relations between 
West Germany and the East.
”Euromissile” opponents were particularly affected 
by Moscow’s threats to break off arms talks if the INF 
deployments proceded. As the date for implementation of 
the modernization plan drew near, Soviet statements on 
arms negotiations increased. The general line taken by 
the Russians was that cessation of negotiations, even if 
initiated by the Soviets, would be the result of American
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intransigence. According to a Central Committee Deputy, 
deployment of the new systems would "completely undermine 
the basis of the current talks.
Russian efforts to influence public opinion in Western. 
Europe proved to be a two-edged sword. While Soviet accu­
sations that the NATO modernization would spark another 
round of the arms race and increase the likelihood of conflict 
were widely accepted by "Euromissile" activists. Alliance 
officials viewed Soviet pronouncements as dangerous. Soviet 
propaganda activities during the neutron bomb affair might
have left the impression that Moscow was able to dictate
SOAlliance policy. That impression had to be dispelled.
The more Moscow publicly pushed for a negative decision 
on the TNF deployment, the more pressure was applied on the 
Alliance to demonstrate its ability to counter Soviet influ­
ence, Once the initial decisiorr to deploy was made in 
December 1979, the Alliance was in the position where cancel­
lation of the deployment would indicate a lack of resolve.
Had a president who opposed the new deployments been 
elected to succeed Jimmy Carter, the TNF modernization plan 
might have been halted, although there would still have 
been considerable political pressure to carry out the 
deployments. When Ronald Reagan came to office, the 
deployment, for practical purposes, was assured.
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Conclusion
The first missiles of NATO's modernized long-range 
nuclear force arrived at Greenham Common, just outside of 
London, on November 14, 1983. As similar deployments began 
in Germany a few days later, the Soviets reacted, and on 
November 23, 1983 they withdrew from INF talks which had 
been underway for two years. By the end of December,
Moscow had also broken off negotiations on conventional 
force levels, and refused to discuss scheduling a new - 
round of the SALT talks which had recently adjourned.
Moscow announced that the Soviet bloc was in the process
51of reassessing its policy on consultations with the West.
American reaction to the Soviet withdrawals was 
restrained. Secretary Weinberger announced that he
52expected negotiations to resume within a matter of months.
By March 1984, however, senior NATO officials conferring in
Brussels concluded that nuclear arms talks between the
5 3superpowers were not likely to take place in 1984.
In January 1984, Soviet sources confirmed that new deploy­
ments of SS-22s were taking place in East Germany. In 
February, Soviet Delta-class submarines moved to positions 
which would make their missiles* delivery times comparable
to the Pershing II.
The beginnings of the NATO deployments did not signal
the end of European demonstrations. Throughout the 
winter of 1983 and 1984 protesters in England and Germany
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
attempted to block the entrances of U.S. military instal­
lations* Although the Soviet Union had been put on the 
public defensive because of its decision to discontinue 
arms talks, opposition to the U.S. missiles did not abate.
The "hardline" followed by the Reagan administration 
on the military buildup assured continued U.S. support for 
the TNF deployments. For the most part, protest movements 
continued to be unable to exert sufficient electoral pres­
sures to weaken European governments* support for the new 
systems. In Belgium and Holland, where the pressure was 
intense, the governments deferred decisions that might 
have brought a change of government. The way was clear 
for the stationing of the missiles in England, West Germany, 
and Italy. Despite continuing protests, the deployments 
would proceed.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS
Like all historical events, the December 1979 decision
to deploy modernized nuclear systems in Western Europe was
comprised of components which mirrored past patterns and
elements which reflected the unique circumstances of current
events* As president of NATO’s most powerful country,
Jimmy Carter’s special predilections were bound to influence
Alliance policies, but long-standing precedents were also
certain to play a major part in determining the course
of the Alliance*
American policymakers throughout the nuclear age have
noted the influence of technology’s momentum on policy
formulation* President Carter was determined to reduce
the number of weapons in the world’s nuclear arsenal, but
as he took office a number of weapons systems, including
the cruise, Pershing II, ERW, MX, and B—1 were well on the
their way to production and deployment. President Carter
echoed the sentiments of officials in each of the previous
nuclear age administrations:
New weapons systems are always being conceived.
They pass through research, design, and testing, 
and them perhaps go on to deployment. This 
process can take as long as ten years, and once 
it gains momentum, it is almost impossible to 
stop.i
Carter attempted to stop production of the ERW and B—1; 
both systems are still being funded by Congress.
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It seems quite clear that the tactical nuclear weapons 
in development in 1977 had not been assigned any clear mis­
sion by the United States Defense Department, but were 
examples of systems based on the availability of technology 
rather than on military or political need. There may well 
be a direct correlation between the availability of these 
and other new systems, to the tendency of each administra­
tion, from Eisenhower through Reagan, to devise strategies 
which offer the Commander-in-Chief more and more nuclear 
options•
Each increasingly flexible plan, from the "new look" 
to "horizontal escalation" was designed, in large part, to 
increase the credibility of deterrence; consequently, each 
new strategy was bound to leave the disquieting impression 
that policymakers were preparing to wage nuclear war when 
the deterrent failed. In the name of a more credible 
deterrence posture additional rungs were added to the ecala— 
tory ladder, and as credibility increased the nuclear 
threshold fell.
Historically, U.S. attempts to make its nuclear deter­
rent more believable have been in response to Western European 
doubts. The European initiative for deployment of the new 
LRTNFs was based on the contention that filling the "gap" 
between strategic and short-range tactical forces with
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longer-range tactical weapons would enhance the continuum 
of NATO’s deterrent. Proponents of the INF modernization 
maintained that the new missiles would also serve to 
reestablish NATO’s escalation dominance. Both assertions 
are incorrect and dangerous.
Neither the GLCM nor Pershing II can be considered 
tactical weapons. Both have the ability to strike Moscow 
and beyond, and there is little, if any, reason to suspect 
that Soviet leaders would view the warheads delivered to 
Russian territory by the LRINF systems any differently than 
those delivered by other strategic systems based in the 
United States or deployed on submarines. The missiles 
will not serve as an additional rung on NATO’s escalatory 
continuum, because they are an addition to the already 
existing rung of strategic weapons.
Nor are the new systems likely to bolster NATO’s 
ability to control escalation. Counter-deployments already 
started by the Soviet Union would preclude this possibility, 
but even if the Soviets did not intend to match the new 
Allied deployments, a supposition which would be most 
naive, the strategic importance of the missiles would 
act to ’•self-deter”̂ U.S. use. From the American stand­
point, use of the weapons during limited nuclear war 
would mean an immediate escalation to the strategic level.
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The threat presented by the GLCM or Pershing II is 
only marginally more credible than the use of other strategic 
weapons in the U.S. arsenal. This marginal increase in 
credibility has serious implications for U.S. policy, 
because the increase is derived from the possibility of 
uncontrolled use. Land-based U.S. strategic systems are 
now stationed less than 160 miles from territory controlled 
by the Warsaw Pact. Should conventional forces overrun or 
surround these NATO installations, missile commanders would 
be faced with the prospect of having their weapons captured. 
The temptation to use them rather than lose them would be 
strong. In a very real sense, the new deployments link 
U.S. strategic weapons to Europe's defense; they do so by 
stationing U.S. strategic weapons in vulnerable European 
emplacements.
The missiles deployed in Germany also add to the 
probability of escalation by presenting the Soviets with 
a threat to their command positions. The highly accurate 
Pershing II can reach Russian territory in four to six 
minutes, and because flight characteristics make the GLCM 
difficult to detect on radar, the cruise may present an 
equally provocative threat from the Soviet military perspec­
tive. The pressures for launching a pre-emptive strike 
against NATO nulcear forces have increased substanitally 
since the deployment of the Allies new INPs. The nuclear
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threshold has been substantially lowered.
In a less direct way, the new deployments also lower
the threshold by confirming the nuclear focus traditionally
held by the^ European Allies. The pattern of reliance on
nuclear systems at the expense of credible conventional
forces has been repeated with the LRINF decision. During
the debates on the modernization program, the long-standing
tendency of Allied military planners to over-estimate the
strength of Soviet military capabilities helped to enhance
the perception that conventional defense against the Warsaw
Pact was impossible. U.S. intelligence reports had indicated
that Soviet military expenditures were growing, in real terms,
from 3 to 5 percent annually from 1976 through 1981. In
March 1983, revised estimates showed that the growth rate
2was closer to 2 percent a year.
In military terms there can be no doubt that the 
Soviet SS—20 poses an additional threat to Western Europe. 
There should also be little doubt that the pace of technol­
ogy is instrumental in the Soviets* choice of weapons 
systems. Missiles intended to replace the aging 55—4 and 
SS-5 would tend to be designed with the best technology at 
hand. Since this technology included multiple warheads, 
more efficient propellants, and better guidance systems, 
the SS-20 was bound to be a more effective weapon, and 
it was bound to elicit the same type of fear that earlier
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bomb and missile "gaps" had created. it is safe to assume 
that the new technologies used in the GLCM and Pershing II 
are also a cause of great concern in Moscow.
Although many traditional elements were prominent 
factors in NATO's December 1979 decision, the consultative 
mechinism used within the Alliance was quite unique. European 
governments were required to accept more responsibility than 
they had in the past. New pressures, including increased 
public scrutiny, led to expanded debate on the proposed 
deployments. The potential military and political effects 
of the new systems were thoroughly studied in a variety of 
forums.
The initial American decision to support the new 
weapons was based almost exclusively on political consider­
ations. Any criticism that the United States was swept 
along by military impulses and ignored the political 
implications of the deployments would have to be rejected.
Yet it may be true that the United States did not give 
adequate consideration to the effects of the deployments 
on U.S.-Soviet and European-Soviet relations.
The Carter administration decided to use the new 
weapons as a political tool to strengthen a military alliance. 
The cruise and Pershing II would be symbols of America's 
commitment to the Allies. Some analysts have noted that 
"nuclear weapons are simply too terrifying a symbol for
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Alliance cohesion,”^ but in the nuclear age it is difficult 
to see what other effective symbol exists. Why this symbol 
should be a strategic system deployed near the front lines 
of a potential war zone is a question which apparently was 
not given adequate attention by Carter officials.
Recommendations
The United States government should give serious 
consideration to the removal of the newly emplaced GLCM 
and Pershing II systems from West Germany. The vulnerability 
and strategic importance of these systems make deployment 
in forward based areas inadvisable. The U.S. should ensure 
that the fullest possible Allied discussions of the proposed 
withdrawals take place. American officials should be pre­
pared to furnish a more appropriate symbol of U.S. commitment 
to Atlantic defense if Alliance cohesion appears to be 
seriously threatened by the withdrawals. At the same time, 
the United States should make every effort to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other Alliance members.
If the new LRINFs are to remain in Italy or England, it 
is important that they be properly integrated into the 
command and control structure which is designed for strategic, 
not theater, weapons.
The Alliance consultation process initiated by 
Jimmy Carter, or some similar process, should become
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standard procedure within the Alliance. Promises to expand 
conventional capabilities must be implemented. The United 
States is likely to continue its prédominent position in 
the Allied nuclear equation ; consequently, American policy­
makers must be prepared to lead the way toward a shift in 
focus to non-nuclear options. Unless European confi­
dence in the U.S. nuclear commitment can be enhanced, the 
focus of military debate and action within the Alliance will 
continue to be on nuclear issues. The Europeans must be a 
allowed greater participation in nuclear decisions, because 
if confidence can not be built within a consultative frame­
work y the European Allies are almost certain to continue 
seeking reassurances through requests for additional 
nuclear hardware»
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DEFINITIONS OF COMMONLY USED TERMS
Circular Error Probable (CEP): a unit of measurement used 
to describe a delivery system's accuracy- The CEP number 
indicates the radius within which at least 50 percent of 
the delivery systems are expected t-o fall-’
Cruise Missile: an airbreathing, low flying, subsonic 
missile» Technology for the cruise dates from the V—1 
used by Germany in World War II.
Deterrence: policies designed to prevent aggression by 
convincing a potential enemy that the negative consequences 
of aggression outweigh any advantages which might be gained 
by it.
Dual-Key: an Allied provision for the physical control 
of nuclear weapons- No European ally has sole possession 
of U.S. nuclear devices; U.S. permission, together with 
the physical release of the weapon to the Ally, would 
have to be given before the Ally could launch the weapon-
Escalation Control: maintenance at each level of escalation 
of sufficient weapons to deter enemy escalation to that 
level-
Forward Strategy: a basic NATO defense tenet which asserts 
that Soviet aggression must be met as far east as possible-
General Purpose Forces : in most contexts, conventional and 
tactical nuclear forces-
Intermediate Nuclear Force: designation used by NATO since 
1981 to describe Theater Nuclear Forces- Since 1981 NATO 
documents have used the INF designation rather than the 
TNF acronym- On some NATO documents the designation has 
been changed retroactively.
Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force (LRTNF): in general, 
theater nuclear forces with a range of over 1,500 kilometers
Nuclear Threshold: the theoretical dividing line between 
conventional and nuclear war- The higher the threshold, 
the less likely that a conventional war will escalate to 
a nuclear one-
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Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs): weapons systems designed 
with targeting components which assure at least a 50 percent 
chance of hitting enemy targets. The PGM designation is 
most commonly used in the classification of small, battle­
field weapons.
Second Strike: a nuclear counter-strike made in response 
to an initial strike by enemy nuclear forces.
Tactical Nuclear Weapon: in general, nuclear weapons may 
be said to be tactical if their use is directly related 
to specific battlefield situations.
Theater Nuclear Weapons (TNFs): nuclear weapons designed 
to be used within a theater of action in order to achieve 
results related to theater operations.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile
ERW Enhanced Radiation Weapon
GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile
HLG High Level Group
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
INF Intermediate Nuclear Force
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
LTDP Long Term Defense Program
LRINF Longer Range Intermediate Nuclear Force
LRTNF Long Range Theater Nuclear Force
MLF Multilateral Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPG Nuclear Planning Group
ORA Quick Reaction Alert
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SCAD Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy
SCM Strategic Cruise Missile
SG Special Group
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
TNW Theater Nuclear Weapon
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